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THE LOG LOG PRIOR FOR THE FREQUENCY OF EXTRATERRESTRIAL INTELLIGENCES
Brian C. Lacki∅
ABSTRACT
It is unclear how frequently life and intelligence arise on planets. I consider a Bayesian prior for
the probability PETI that intelligence evolves at a suitable site, with weight distributed evenly over
ln(1 − lnPETI). This log log prior can handle a very wide range of PETI values, from 1 to 10−10
122
,
while remaining responsive to evidence about extraterrestrial societies. It is motivated by our uncer-
tainty in the number of conditions that must be fulfilled for intelligence to arise, and it is related to
considerations of information, entropy, and state space dimensionality. After setting a lower limit to
PETI from the number of possible genome sequences, I calculate a Bayesian confidence of 18% that
aliens exist within the observable Universe. With different assumptions about the minimum PETI
and the number of times intelligence can appear on a planet, this value falls between 1.4% and 47%.
Overall, the prior leans towards our being isolated from extraterrestrial intelligences, but indicates
that we should not be confident of this conclusion. I discuss the implications of the prior for the Search
for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, concluding that searches for interstellar probes from nearby societies
seem relatively effective. I also discuss the possibility of very small probabilities allowed by the prior
for the origin of life and the Fermi Paradox, and note that similar priors might be constructed for
interesting complex phenomena in general.
Keywords: extraterrestrial intelligence — philosophy of astronomy — astrobiology
1. INTRODUCTION
Of course we are not alone. We now know the
Earth is but one of billions of planets in the Galaxy,
and the Milky Way is but one of billions of galaxies
(Johnson et al. 2010; Cassan et al. 2012; Petigura et al.
2013; Zackrisson et al. 2016). Intelligent life arose
on Earth through natural processes. Since the laws
of physics and astrophysical environments of galax-
ies are basically uniform through the observable Uni-
verse, there’s no reason why analogous processes could
not happen on other planets. Self-organization is a
very general phenomenon capable of generating the
complexity required by life (Kauffman 1995), and
life appeared early in Earth’s history, suggesting its
ubiquity (Lineweaver & Davis 2002; Ward & Brownlee
2004). Intelligence may also be common: our bio-
sphere is filled with examples of convergent evolution
(Conway Morris 2003), and several clades of animals
demonstrate cognition and even tool use (e.g., Marino
2002; Emery 2006; Hochner et al. 2006). Even if the
odds of it happening on a particular planet are one in a
trillion, billions of other societies have evolved over the
Universe’s history (Frank & Sullivan 2016).
Of course we are alone. With a benign astronomical
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environment and rare geological processes, the Earth is
a far better long-term home for life than a typical terres-
trial planet (Gonzalez et al. 2001; Conway Morris 2003;
Ward & Brownlee 2004). Even simple proteins or self-
replicating nucleic acids are enormously complex; the
odds of a planet generating functional molecules that as-
semble themselves into a working cell may be beyond as-
tronomically tiny (Yockey 2000; Conway Morris 2003).
Even if life did appear on another planet, human-like in-
telligence is a very specific adaption to the very specific
pressures that the ancestors of Homo sapiens experi-
enced. So many adaptions occurred on the way that it
is unlikely that sequence of influences will recur if things
were slightly different (Simpson 1964; Gould 1989; Mayr
2001). And in fact, most organisms get along fine
without intelligence; prokaryotes form the great major-
ity of living things (see Whitman et al. 1998). There’s
no good reason to believe that our intelligence is any-
thing common if our own biosphere is anything to go by
(Simpson 1964; Mayr 2001; Lineweaver 2009).
These are, in broad strokes, a priori arguments for and
against there being extraterrestrial intelligence (ETI) in
the observable Universe.1 It is clear that there is an
1 I am purposefully vague about what intelligence is, but I ba-
sically mean an organism that is biologically capable of build-
ing technology that can send signals across interstellar distances.
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astronomical number of rocky, terrestrial planets in our
past light cone where life and intelligence could develop,
roughly ∼ 1021 (Zackrisson et al. 2016). The number
of planets is known to around an order of magnitude,
but it is unfortunately useless unless we know the odds
that intelligence actually does arise on a planet — for
all we know, it could be 10−100 or smaller, in which case
we are effectively alone. On the other hand, there is
no well-motivated estimate for that probability. Even
granting that Homo sapiens is unlikely to recur, there
could be many ways for intelligence to arise (as in Gould
1987; C´irkovic´ 2014), and a planet has millions and mil-
lions of chances to find even one. Our uniqueness in
Earth’s biosphere might indicate that probability of in-
telligence evolving is much less than 1 (e.g., Mayr 2001;
Lineweaver 2009). But our uniqueness on Earth, by it-
self, is about equally compatible with the probability be-
ing 0.01, 10−10, 10−20, 10−100, and 10−10
9
, values which
would have very different implications for how populated
the Universe is.
Ideally, the matter could be settled empirically,
which is the aim of the Search for Extraterrestrial
Intelligence (SETI; Cocconi & Morrison 1959; Tarter
2001). SETI has sought evidence for extraterres-
trials through many programs and an increasing
number of methods, from the traditional surveys
for radio broadcasts (e.g., Tarter 1985; Blair et al.
1992; Horowitz & Sagan 1993; Anderson et al. 2002;
Gray & Ellingsen 2002; Siemion et al. 2010), to searches
for laser light (Shvartsman et al. 1993; Reines & Marcy
2002; Howard et al. 2004; Hanna et al. 2009; Borra
2012), high energy radiation (Harris 2002; see also
Learned 1994; Corbet 1997; Lacki 2015), extraterres-
trial technology in the Solar System (Freitas 1983; Steel
1995), artificial “megastructures” the sizes of plan-
ets (Arnold 2005; Wright et al. 2016; Boyajian et al.
2016) or star systems (Slysh 1985; Timofeev et al.
2000; Jugaku & Nishimura 2004; Carrigan 2009;
Villarroel et al. 2016), and the engineering of entire
galaxies (Kardashev 1964; Annis 1999; Wright et al.
2014a; Griffith et al. 2015; Zackrisson et al. 2015; Lacki
2016). But so far, no alien societies have been found
yet, and there is no consensus about what that means
(Brin 1983; C´irkovic´ 2009). Do extraterrestrials exist
PETI is proportional to flfi in Drake’s equation (described in
Sagan 1963; Tarter 2001, among others), but also depends on the
number of “birthsites” per planet. A species that actually devel-
ops this technology is called a technological society in this work.
Throughout this paper, I largely ignore cultural evolution (the fc
factor of the Drake equation), but in principle it could be the lim-
iting factor in whether SETI will find anything (Ashkenazi 1995;
Davies 2010). Even then, one could use a log log prior for fc
since there are a finite number of distinct societies according to
the Bekenstein Bound.
but remain too quiet to be observable yet (e.g., Freitas
1985; Scheffer 1994; Haqq-Misra & Baum 2009), or
would they rapidly grow until they become obvious
even across cosmic distances (as in Hart 1975; Tipler
1980; Wright et al. 2014b)?
1.1. The Anthropic and Copernican Principles
In the absence of hard evidence, the debate has oc-
casionally turned to philosophical arguments. It is in-
disputable that life with human-like intelligence exists
in the form of humanity. As with the SETI null re-
sults, the interpretation of even this trivial positive re-
sult is disputed. The debate frequently centers around
two principles: the Anthropic Principle and the Coper-
nican Principle.
The Anthropic Principle essentially says that our ex-
istence or situation is somehow inevitable, regardless of
how special or improbable we are (Carter 1974). The
most commonly invoked version is the Weak Anthropic
Principle, which applies if the Universe is very large.
The Weak Anthropic Principle can be formulated in
terms of observations, as a statement about inference:
we cannot deduce the probability of our evolution just
from our existence. Our situation could be very special
(but not unique) and still be consistent with observa-
tion. In statistical terms, as long as the probability of
intelligent life evolving is nonzero, the likelihood of it ex-
isting in an infinite Universe is 1. The inferential Weak
Anthropic Principle is also interpreted as a statement
about selection bias (Carter 1974, 1983).
The Weak Anthropic Principle can also be stated in
in terms of theoretical predictions, as a statement about
causality: in a sufficiently big Universe, the appearance
of humanity somewhere is to be expected, even if the
probability of that happening in a particular location is
very low but non-zero. The conditions necessary for our
evolution may just be one of the special, rare events that
occasionally happen in an infinite Universe.
There are stronger versions of the Anthropic Prin-
ciple, which apply not just to the contingent circum-
stances within the Universe, but to the fundamental
laws of physics themselves (Carter 1974; Barrow 1983).
The most extreme formulations argue that conscious ob-
servers or humanity play some crucial role in the func-
tioning of the Universe. These versions imply that the
Universe is actually compelled to produce us, and it
would be logically impossible for the Universe to exist
without us (Barrow 1983). This is in contrast with the
causal Weak Anthropic Principle, in which the prob-
ability of our not existing in an infinite Universe has
measure 0; the impossibility in the Weak case is merely
statistical rather than logical. As such, stronger An-
thropic Principles say that humanity is truly special in
terms of function or role, not just in terms of being rare,
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and they are far more controversial.
In tension with the Anthropic arguments is the Coper-
nican Principle. The fundamental argument of the
Copernican Principle is that we are not in a special lo-
cation of the Universe, as demonstrated by centuries of
astronomical observation (e.g., Sagan 1994). More gen-
erally, we should assume that our circumstances are not
special (as in its controversial application by Gott 1993).
As far as we can observe, the Earth, Solar System, and
Galaxy are fairly typical in astrophysical terms; other
bodies like them should be common throughout the Uni-
verse. After all, they are the result of natural processes
that could occur anywhere. The Copernican Principle is
related to the Principle of Mediocrity: in the absence of
information, we are more likely to find ourselves in a typ-
ical situation than a rare one (e.g., Brin 1983; Vilenkin
1995).
Even if the evolution of intelligent life is extremely
rare, we can still hold to a weaker argument that I will
call the Weak Copernican Principle. The Weak Coper-
nican Principle states that our evolution is the result of
physical processes that have a non-zero probability of
occurring independently elsewhere in the Universe. If
one accepts a naturalistic view of evolution, this may
seem trivial, but it is not. It is logically possible for a
class of events to have probability measure 0: for exam-
ple, one could flip a fair coin infinitely many times and
get only heads.
The Weak Copernican Principle is also technically dis-
tinct from the causal Weak Anthropic Principle, even if
they both imply our existence is expected in a large
enough Universe. The Weak Copernican Principle im-
plies the evolution of intelligence at a suitably distant
location is independent of our evolution. In contrast,
one could imagine that the evolution of intelligence on
one planet somehow makes it impossible for it to evolve
anywhere else in the Universe. For example, the Uni-
verse might be a computer simulation which is designed
to randomly place life on one and only one planet. This
could still be consistent with the Weak Anthropic Prin-
ciple, as long as the probability of life appearing the
first time is large enough. On the other hand, the Weak
Copernican Principle doesn’t say that our evolution is
inevitable; it still applies if the chance that life evolves
around a star is 10−100 and there are only 10 stars in
the Universe.
In some sense, it is clear that both the Anthropic and
Copernican arguments are partly true. The Weak An-
thropic Principle is true in that most of the Universe’s
volume is not filled with intelligent life forms, even if
every planet is habitable. For that matter, the other
planets in our Solar System and the Sun are unfit for
human habitation; this was not clear a few centuries
ago (Crowe 1999). The Copernican Principle is true in
that there are planets besides the Earth, and solar sys-
tems besides our own. Just a few decades ago, it was an
open question if exoplanets existed at all or if the So-
lar System was the result of an improbable stellar event
(Dick 1998), and the existence of other planets was also
unclear a few centuries ago. Now the problem is to fig-
ure out how to extrapolate these principles beyond the
evolution of stars and planets to the evolution of life and
intelligence.
1.2. The question of priors
The philosophical debate about the existence of aliens
can be understood as a debate about priors. In Bayesian
probability theory, a prior is a subjective judgment
about how much one believes in a hypothesis before an
observational test is done. Given a continuously vary-
ing parameter α, the prior dPprior/dα takes the form of a
probability distribution function (PDF) over the allowed
values of α (Trotta 2008).
When new evidence arrives, Bayes’ theorem describes
how the prior can be transformed into a posterior de-
scribing subjective levels of belief after considering evi-
dence from an observation (Trotta 2008):
Pposterior(Hypothesis|Observation) =
L(Hypothesis|Observation)
Pprior(Hypothesis)
P (Observation)
. (1)
Bayes’ theorem requires the likeli-
hood L(Hypothesis|Observation) =
P (Observation|Hypothesis), which is the probabil-
ity that one would make a given observation if the
hypothesis is true. The likelihood can frequently be
estimated theoretically for a well-characterized model
and a well-understood experiment. In addition, Bayes’
theorem requires an evidence factor P (Observation),
which is a normalizing factor. It basically is the proba-
bility that one would make an observation according to
a prior, including the cases where the hypothesis is true
and where the hypothesis is false. For the continuous
parameter α, Bayes’ theorem is phrased as
dPposterior
dα
=
L(α|Observation)
dPprior
dα∫
L(α|Observation)
dPprior
dα
dα
. (2)
Although the choice of prior is subjective, the Princi-
ple of Mediocrity is a general guiding principle. It says
that, in the absence of evidence, we should assume that
no particular value is special, and therefore we should
favor no value over another (Trotta 2008). Otherwise,
if all of the prior weight is concentrated into a few hy-
potheses, we effectively assume whichever hypothesis we
wish to prove. Then even if evidence strongly points
towards an alternate hypothesis, we essentially ignore
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it and cling to the old theory (for example, the “Pre-
sumptuous Philosopher” thought experiment recounted
in Bostrom & C´irkovic´ 2003). For a continuous param-
eter, the prior should not be too strongly weighted to-
wards one value, which is fulfilled if it is flat. Note that
a flat prior for a parameter α does not remain flat if the
variable α is transformed, such as if we then consider
lnα. If α might have values that vary over orders of
magnitude, a logarithmic prior that is uniform in lnα
(flat log prior) seems like a reasonable choice, since it
has no scale. (e.g., Trotta 2008; Spiegel & Turner 2012;
Tegmark 2014).
Different conclusions are reached if different facts of
our evolution are emphasized as representative. The
timescales for our evolution is a common source of specu-
lative reasoning. The idea is that a habitable planet has
some unchanging chance of producing intelligent life in a
unit of time, ΓETI. This is appropriate if the appearance
of intelligence depends on a process that is independent
of history, like an evolutionary process generating cer-
tain key traits through a random walk (Carter 1983).
Life appeared quite early in our planet’s history, which
would not be typical if life arose through such ran-
dom processes (Γlife ≪ 10−10 yr). Lineweaver & Davis
(2002) interprets this observation as evidence that
life arises quickly on planets and is common (as in
Ward & Brownlee 2004), but others argue that intelli-
gence can only arise if life appears early and this atyp-
icality could be an anthropic bias (Hanson 1998). The
choice of a prior on Γlife also affects whether meaningful
constraints are then set on Γlife (Spiegel & Turner 2012).
Behroozi & Peeples (2015) applies an analogous argu-
ment on cosmological scales, arguing for a large ΓETI
large because the Earth formed before most of the Uni-
verse’s virialized gas had a chance to collapse into plan-
ets.
On the other hand, Carter (1983) noted that the
timescale for humanity’s evolution is close to the habit-
able lifespan of the Earth. He essentially interprets this
observation according to a flat log prior in the evolu-
tionary timescale. Of all the many orders of magnitude
this timescale could have been, it is unlikely to have
matched the Earth’s lifespan so closely, so he interprets
the coincidence as the result of anthropic selection; the
expected timescale is much longer, and intelligent life is
very rare. Furthermore, using a simple model of evolu-
tion, he argues that the timing is related to the number
of unlikely steps that occurred along the way of our evo-
lution (Carter 1983; see also Hanson 1998; Carter 2008;
Davies 2010).
But this argument too has been disputed;
C´irkovic´ et al. (2009) argues that astrophysical ex-
tinction events like gamma ray bursts can slow down
the actual time it takes for intelligent life to evolve
even if the unimpeded timescale is fairly short. It’s also
possible that a critical evolutionary step is directly tied
to the sun’s properties (Chyba & Hand 2005). Livio
(1999) suggests the critical step is the development of
an ozone layer, which is related to the photodissociation
of atmospheric water vapor into oxygen; this process is
only efficient for blue stars no more long-lived than the
Sun.
It’s also possible that the evolution timescale is not
the relevant factor, because the evolution of life is con-
strained by earlier arbitrary events. For example, it is
unlikely that a life form will greatly change the genetic
code mapping amino acids to DNA nucleotide sequences;
the cost is too great as it risks turning all of the genes
into gibberish (Crick 1968). But this code was set very
early in the development of life. If the appearance of in-
telligence depended on having a particular genetic code
(compare with Conway Morris 2003), then whether it
evolves on a particular planet could have little to do
with the time available.
By itself, this wouldn’t explain the coincidence be-
tween the Sun’s lifetime and the time for humanity to
evolve, but one could imagine that events very early
in life’s evolution launches it on a nearly fixed course
that predetermines whether and how long until intelli-
gence appears. If there’s a small chance that this trajec-
tory leads to intelligence appearing in 10 Gyr, a much
smaller chance that intelligence appears in 1 Gyr, a
much smaller chance that it appears in 100 Myr, and
so on, most intelligence would appear near the end of
their planet’s lifespan, without depending on the pres-
ence of discrete evolutionary barriers along the way.
In a recent book, Tegmark (2014) presented a rela-
tively simple argument that suggests that we are alone.
The probability that intelligent life PETI arises on a
given planet is unknown, even at an order of magni-
tude level, so we can adopt a prior that is uniform in
log10 PETI. If log10 PETI is between −21 and 0, then we
are not alone. But we have no reason to set −21 as a
lower limit; given our ignorance, it could easily extend to
−100 or further. Because of the huge range in log10 PETI
allowed by our ignorance, relatively little weight is left
to be spread over the range of −21 < log10 PETI < 0, so
this reasonable prior indicates that we are likely alone
in the observable Universe (Tegmark 2014).2
2 This telling is slightly altered from its presentation in Tegmark
(2014). The first difference is that the book focuses on a flat log
prior in the distance to the nearest alien society, although a flat log
prior in PETI is given as the motivation. The fundamental quan-
tity is the probability that intelligence evolves on a world, and
the number of worlds tracks comoving volume. The logarithm of
the comoving distance is not proportional to the logarithm of the
comoving distance if space is slightly curved. Second, Tegmark
(2014) applies the Fermi Paradox (described in Hart 1975; Tipler
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But this argument has a problem — the lower
bound is left undefined, which can lead to strange
results. Fundamental physics implies that there are
at most ∼ e3×10
122
configurations for the observable
Universe (Egan & Lineweaver 2010), so we might take
log10 PETI = −10
122 as a lower bound. Unfortunately,
this prior then makes it essentially impossible to con-
vince its holder that aliens exist, since the prior prob-
ability for their presence in the observable Universe is
∼ 10−122. Besides requiring an extremely high level of
statistical confidence before concluding a positive result
is correct, it is essentially impossible to rule out the pos-
sibility of systematic errors to that degree. Even for a
well characterized experiment, you could always decide
that the evidence is always fraudulent, or that you are
hallucinating. While such possibilities are unlikely, can
you really be sure that they are more unlikely than 1
part in 10122?
1.3. Introducing the log log prior
A fundamental disagreement in estimates of PETI is
the number of conditions that are required for intelli-
gent life to evolve. Suppose there are N conditions that
must be fulfilled for aliens to appear, and for simplicity,
each is independent of each other and the probability of
each holding is 1/2. Then PETI = 2−N : so if N = 1,
PETI = 1/2; if N = 10, PETI = 1/1, 024; if N = 100,
PETI ≈ 10−30 and so on. If N is uncertain at the order
of magnitude level, then even the order of magnitude of
PETI is also uncertain at the order of magnitude level.
This accounts for the vast disagreements about PETI:
an optimist who believes that only a few conditions are
relevant can end up thinking that PETI ≈ 1, while a pes-
simist that believes that thousands of conditions need to
be fulfilled can find combinatorially small estimates of
PETI ≪ 10−1,000.
The notion of an uninformative prior thus suggests
that we should use a prior for the number of conditions
that is constant in logN (e.g., Trotta 2008). This trans-
lates to a prior that is constant in log | logPETI|. The
advantage of this prior is that it can handle scenarios
where N is allowed to range up to ∼ 3 × 10122, the en-
tropy of the Universe (with PETI ≈ e−3×10
122
), while
remaining responsive to any future evidence that aliens
exist.
1.4. Outline and conventions
1980) to rule out −10 . log10 PETI < 0, closing the window for
which aliens could exist in the observable Universe. But system-
atic uncertainties can blunt null results, and the prior weight in
this window could be so low for the log prior that applying the
Fermi Paradox has insignificant value.
The loose motivation for the log log prior is devel-
oped further in more quantitative terms in Section 2.
The concepts of entropy, information, and state space
dimensionality play key roles. I discuss some problems
that arise when trying to formulate a log log prior and
apply it. I also provide a simple model of a SETI exper-
iment to demonstrate the prior’s response.
The Bayesian credibility that ETIs exist in our past
light cone is calculated in Section 3. I use various es-
timates of the entropy of biological systems and their
environments to establish a lower limit to PETI for a
planet. I also describe what happens if we consider
smaller birthsites, to allow for the possibility that intel-
ligence evolves off of planets or can evolve many times
on a planet.
In Section 4, I evaluate SETI surveys according to how
much of the prior’s weight they might constrain. Then
I discuss some additional problems and implications of
the log log prior in Section 5: (1) In a small Universe,
one can construct a joint prior on the Universe’s size
and PETI, complicating the weighting. (2) The log log
prior suggests that the diversity of intelligent species is
beyond astronomically vast. (3) The small probabilities
considered for PETI raise the issue if there’s a similarly
small probability that intelligent life is starfaring, which
would neutralize the Fermi Paradox. (4) A log log prior
might be useful for estimating credibility in the rates of
any complex phenomenon, including life itself. I con-
clude the paper with a summary (Section 6).
I use the values of the fundamental constants and cos-
mological parameters listed in Table 1 throughout this
paper.
Table 1. Constants used in this paper
Name Value Description
c 2.998 × 1010 cm s−1 Speed of light
h 6.626 × 10−27 erg s Planck’s constant
G 6.674 × 10
−8
×dyn cm2 g−2
Newton’s constant
kB 1.381 × 10
−16 erg K−1 Boltzmann’s constant
NA 6.022 × 10
23 Avogadro’s number
amu 1.661 × 10−24 g Atomic mass unit
M⊙ 1.989 × 10
33 g Solar mass
Mpc 3.0857 × 1024 cm Megaparsec
H0 67.74 km s
−1 Mpc−1 Hubble’s constant
Ωb 0.04866 Cosmic baryon density
Ωr 5.385 × 10
−5 Cosmic photon density
Ωm 0.3089 Cosmic matter density
Table 1 continued
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Table 1 (continued)
Name Value Description
ΩΛ 0.6911 Dark energy density
Note—The values of the fundamental constants and units are
taken from Olive et al. (2015). I use the H0, Ωb, and Ωm from
Ade et al. (2015) (the “TT, TE, EE+lowP+lensing+ext” col-
umn of Table 4). The value of Ωr is calculated under the
assumption that only the Cosmic Microwave Background con-
tributes to the cosmic radiation density, and that it has a tem-
perature 2.725 K (Fixsen 2009). I assume ΛCDM cosmology
with ΩΛ = 1− Ωm − Ωr.
This paper discusses both Bayesian probability, our
confidence in a hypothesis, and frequentist probability,
an inherent property of stochastic processes in the Uni-
verse. Although both can appear together in Bayes’
equation, they are very different in meaning. To help
distinguish them, I will use the symbol P for Bayesian
probabilities and P for frequentist probabilities. The
most common of each symbol is Pcrowded, the Bayesian
credibility assigned to the hypothesis that there are
aliens in our past light cone, and PETI, the frequentist
fraction of birthsites that evolve intelligent life.
This paper also makes combinatorial arguments about
the multitudes of ways of combining a number of objects
or traits. I use N or ℓ to enumerate physical things or
properties which are actually present in the Universe,
like the number of planets in our past light cone or the
number of amino acids in a protein. For the number
of possible combinations of these objects, almost all of
which will never be realized within the observable Uni-
verse, I use N . Finally, I use S for physical, measurable
entropy and S for unitless Boltzmann-like entropies.
2. A QUANTITATIVE FORMULATION OF THE
LOG LOG PRIOR
2.1. Finding aliens in state space
Intelligent life is generated when certain circumstances
apply at a given birthsite. A birthsite is an independent
opportunity for ETI to evolve presented by a complex
system that serves as a habitat.3 The probability that
a birthsite leads to intelligent life is PETI. For example,
a habitat may be a planet, and a birthsite may just be
the planet’s existence or specific events in the planet’s
history, like a speciation. In the latter case, PETI may
be multiplied by the rate that birthsites occur to find
ΓETI, how often a habitat produces ETI.
3 Throughout this paper, I effectively consider humanity an ETI
when describing the evolution of intelligence.
Habitats are very complicated. The number of pos-
sible states of a system grows exponentially with the
number of independent parameters needed to describe
it. The immense variety is often conceptualized as a
state space Ω, with each independent condition corre-
sponding to an entire dimension of the space. Each
possible state is a point in the space; because of con-
siderations from fundamental physics, I shall assume
that the spaces are discrete and finite (Bekenstein 1981;
Bousso 2002), with Nall points in total. Each combina-
tion is a microstate of a system, and the volume of a
subset is given by the number of points inside it. There
are many possible state spaces that could describe the
evolution of a habitat: the Hilbert space of quantum
wavefunctions of the Universe, a planet, or an organ-
ism; sequence spaces enumerating every possible genome
(the “Library of Mendel” of Dennett 1995)4, protein
(Maynard Smith 1970), or combination of alleles in an
organism (Kauffman 1995); and morphology spaces de-
scribing the basic shapes of proteins (Dill 1999) or or-
ganisms (Conway Morris 2003; C´irkovic´ 2014). Each mi-
crostate has some probability assigned to it.
Only some states of a habitat host ETIs. Judging from
the lack of technological societies during most of Earth’s
history, only a small region ΩETI of a habitat’s state
space includes these states. Many more microstates of
a habitat could lead to the generation of intelligent life
during the habitat’s lifetime. These are included in a
region Ωgen. One can consider the union of Ngen mi-
crostates contained in Ωgen to be a kind of macrostate.
Note, however, that this macrostate does not need to be
connected in state space, and it might be much coarser
or finer than thermodynamic macrostates. One can de-
fine a Boltzmann-like entropy for Ωgen:
Sgen = lnNgen, (3)
which can range between 0 and Sall = lnNall. If each
microstate is equally likely, then the probability that a
birthsite will generate intelligence is the probability that
it starts out in Ωgen:
PETI =
Ngen
Nall
= eSgen−Sall . (4)
4 This is a reference to the fictional Library of Babel, a physical
space of all possible texts with a certain length of certain letters,
space, and punctuation marks. Most of the texts are gibberish,
and this library is chaotic in its organization (Borges 1962). Some
debates about evolution and probability echo the problems in-
herent in the Library of Babel — are most proteins in protein
space non-functional and how does evolution “find” them (e.g.,
Maynard Smith 1970; Dill 1999; Dryden et al. 2008)? Likewise,
the microstates in Ωgen may be rare enclaves of coherence, chaot-
ically scattered all over the abyssal reaches of state space. The
fact that most books have nearly indistinguishable copies (see
also Dennett 1995) is related to the implied diversity of intelli-
gent species I discuss in Section 5.2.
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The fundamental quantity here is the difference in en-
tropy.
If, however, microstates have differing probabilities,
then the probability PETI of starting out in Ωgen can-
not be calculated simply by counting states and its ac-
companying Boltzmann entropy. To complicate matters
further, “entropy” usually refers to Gibbs (Shannon) en-
tropy for physical systems or information sources (Pierce
1960). This is smaller than the Boltzmann entropy and
quantifies the mean amount of information one needs to
determine a system’s microstate. Gibbs entropy makes
no reference to macrostates (Carroll 2010) and is not
directly related to PETI either. To simplify matters, I
assume that the Boltzmann entropy provides a useful
lower bound estimate Pmin ≡ e−Sall for PETI. It pro-
vides a natural cutoff for the log log prior.
Almost all state spaces that can be imagined to de-
scribe biological or ecological systems have a vast num-
ber of dimensions. Wandering into the state neighbor-
hood of the present Earth is essentially impossible in
the exponentially larger spaces. Indeed, the sheer size
of state space is so great for some biological processes,
like protein folding, that it sometimes seems puzzling
that life can survive at all (some proposed solutions in-
clude Maynard Smith 1970; Kauffman 1995; Dill 1999).
Since it is exponentially unlikely a planet would resem-
ble Earth in all details that might affect the evolution of
humanity’s technical abilities, maybe PETI is exponen-
tially suppressed. That is, ΩETI might be too small of a
target to ever hit on a random trajectory through state
space (C´irkovic´ 2014 describes Simpson 1964’s argument
in this way).
But these arguments include a number of assumptions
that have been disputed. First, humanity is not neces-
sarily the only possible kind of intelligent life. There
could be a nearly endless variety of species that can de-
velop interstellar communication, in which case ΩETI
and Ωgen are far larger than the small neighborhood
around the Earth’s current state (Gould 1987; C´irkovic´
2014). Along these lines, many of the details that de-
scribe a birthsite could be completely irrelevant — this
is clear when we consider the Hilbert space of quantum
wavefunctions for the entire Universe. Each irrelevant
detail expands Ωgen exponentially. Second, it’s possible
that the microstates in Ωgen are vastly more likely than
typical microstates. Complex systems frequently include
great attractor basins that channel virtually all trajecto-
ries towards them (Kauffman 1995). As long as this evo-
lution completes while the habitat survives, Ωgen could
include basins that span Ω. Finally, many of the mi-
crostates might actually be impossible (Conway Morris
2003). For example, not all genetic sequences corre-
spond to viable organisms (Dennett 1995). The evolu-
tion of the habitat could be constrained strongly to re-
main in an Earth-like region (Bieri 1964; Conway Morris
2003). The state space would be ripped by great holes
where nothing could wander; less a fitness landscape and
more a fitness tunnel.
With the number of relevant parameters itself uncer-
tain, even to order of magnitude, I suggest that we adopt
a flat log log (double log) prior for PETI:
dPprior
d ln | lnPETI|
∼
1
ln lnPmin
≈
1
lnSall
. (5)
This prior has several interpretations. Even if there are
not easily observed independent parameters that deter-
mine whether intelligence evolves, equation 5 can de-
scribe uncertainty in the number of “extra” dimensions
in the state space. As seen in equation 4, the log log
prior corresponds to a flat log prior in the entropy dif-
ference of Ωgen. The log log prior also describes a flat log
prior in the amount of information one needs to know
about a birthsite before confidently concluding that it
will generate an ETI. And, in fact, all of these are un-
certain to order of magnitude.
Why use a flat log entropy difference prior instead of
a flat log entropy prior, though? A conceptual prob-
lem with a log entropy prior is that one can always
add irrelevant details to the description of a system,
inflating its information content. The actual value of
PETI does not depend on these nuisance parameters, but
the state space nonetheless expands exponentially. And
while Ωgen also grows exponentially, this is not reflected
in a naive log entropy prior. In fact, a log-entropy prior
is less responsive than a simple log-probability prior:
if dPprior/dSgen ∼ 1/Sall, then dPprior/d| lnPETI| =
1/[(Sall + lnPETI) lnSall] < 1/ lnSall. For a concrete
example of the difference between a log entropy differ-
ence prior and a log entropy prior, imagine −10, 000 ≤
lnPETI ≤ −1. The log entropy difference prior, which
is what I use in this paper, places equal weight on
the possibilities that −10, 000 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −1, 000,
−1, 000 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −100, −100 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −10, and
−10 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −1. In contrast, the log entropy prior
places equal weight on the possibilities that −10, 000 ≤
lnPETI ≤ −9, 999, −9, 999 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −9, 990,
−9, 990 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −9, 900, −9, 900 ≤ lnPETI ≤
−9, 000, and −9, 000 ≤ lnPETI ≤ −1. Clearly, the
log entropy prior inappropriately favors incredibly small
chances for ETIs arising.
The log log prior makes sense if all the microstates
have equal probability, or if Ωgen is disproportionately
likely, but what if Ωgen is some kind of repulsor state,
disproportionately unlikely? Then maybe PETI could
be arbitrarily small, even zero in defiance of the Weak
Copernican Principle, leading to the same kinds of prob-
lems that haunted the log prior. I do not believe this is a
realistic possibility, at least if thermodynamic entropies
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are used for Pmin. A fundamental assumption of statis-
tical mechanics is that the thermodynamic microstates
of closed, equilibrium systems are equiprobable (Nash
2006). We might therefore expect technological soci-
eties, including ours, to appear by random thermal fluc-
tuations in any sufficiently large heat bath — perhaps
the ocean of a lifeless planet, the photon background
of the early Universe, or the horizon of a black hole.
The Universe itself has an event horizon that appears
as a heat bath. In the distant future it may evolve into
an equilibrium of some sort, perhaps with occasional
macroscopic fluctuations and equiprobable microstates
(Albrecht 2015). Then, the entropy of the observable
Universe bounds the probability of Ωgen. Using the cos-
mic entropy still results in a responsive prior because of
the weak dependence on Sall in equation 5.
Additionally, the inhabitants of these fluctuation so-
cieties would be Boltzmann brains, with memories and
“knowledge” that do not actually correspond to the ac-
tual Universe (the implications for cosmology are dis-
cussed in Albrecht & Sorbo 2004 and many others). Un-
less our experiences are almost certainly phantasms, our
evolution as we remember it must be far more likely than
thermal fluctuations. This implies that lnPETI is far
bigger than −Sall for a heat bath big enough to create
a Boltzmann brain.
The log log prior, as given in equation 5, is timeless,
in that it makes no reference to the time it takes in-
telligence to evolve in a habitat. If we consider planets
as habitats, it is like saying that either planets do not
evolve ETIs at all, or they evolve it in 4.5 billion years.
This might make sense if we assume that planets start
in one side of state space and launch their biospheres on
a ballistic trajectory through state space; after all, ETIs
are unlikely to be the first life forms on a planet. But it
might be the case that PETI depends on how long a habi-
tat is hospitable, which would definitely be the case if
the trajectory jumped randomly throughout state space.
In that case, the number of birthsites should scale with
time — perhaps each individual organism is a birthsite.
In reality, there may be a whole multitude of ways du-
rations affect PETI, with astronomical conditions being
nearly unchanging while biological conditions are capa-
ble of changing quickly. For simplicity, I mainly ignore
this time evolution, but I do present an upper bound on
the number of temporal birthsites in Section 3.5. The
log log prior is only weakly sensitive to the number of
birthsites.
By itself, the log log prior does not take into account
the observation that we exist. If the Universe is small,
having relatively few birthsites, and if our existence is
due to random chance, then one could update the prior
with the Anthropic observation. Although I consider
the possibility of a small Universe in Section 5.1, for the
rest of the paper, I assume the Universe is essentially in-
finite, in accordance with many currently proposed cos-
mologies. Then the likelihood of our existence is 1, as
noted by the causal Weak Anthropic Principle, and the
resulting “posterior” is the same as the original prior.
I use natural logarithms for the log log prior in equa-
tion 5, but this choice is somewhat arbitrary. Unlike
the log prior, the choice of logarithm base b does affect
the integrated probability that PETI lies in some range.
Conceptually, the base of logarithm describes the in-
verse probability that a parameter has the right value
for an ETI to appear. It can also describe the width
of a state space along one dimension. For a genome se-
quence space, there are 4 possible nucleotide bases at
each location, so b = 4 might be more appropriate; for
a protein sequence space, there are 20 possible amino
acids at each location, so b = 20 might be more appro-
priate. But the dependence on b is very weak, and the
possible variety of alien biologies makes even these sup-
positions uncertain, so I just use b = e throughout the
paper.
Finally, equation 5 does not handle well cases where
PETI ≈ 1. Strictly speaking, a pure log log prior places
infinite weight on PETI → 1, since | ln 0| = ∞. For
simplicity, I will define a parameter
Π ≡ ln(1− lnPETI) (6)
that has a finite value even when PETI = 1. Throughout
this paper, I will then use a log-Π prior
dPprior
dΠ
=
1
ln(1− lnPmin)
=
1
1 + lnSall
≡
1
Πmax
, (7)
which is essentially identical to equation 5 for small
PETI, but leaves some moderate weight on the possibil-
ity that PETI ≈ 1. This quick fix hides conceptual issues
about what a birthsite is, though. A potential birthsite
we consider could actually produce a great number of
intelligent species: this can easily happen if we consider
too large of a site, like an entire galaxy supercluster.
If the limiting factor in the appearance of ETIs is the
origin of life, it’s also entirely possible that life arises
many times on a planet. Then we may need to either
consider much smaller birthsites or place more weight
on PETI ≈ 1. The problem is especially insidious for the
origin of life case since only one biosphere may emerge
from all of the independent kinds of life, or so it may
appear to distant astronomers (c.f., Davies et al. 2009).
If we are unsure whether the deciding factor for PETI is
the origin of life or the evolution of intelligence, there
may not even be a clear definition of birthsite to use.
2.2. The probability that we are “alone”
If there are an infinite (or very large finite) number of
birthsites, then the Weak Copernican Principle virtually
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guarantees that ETIs exist elsewhere. In that sense, of
course we are not alone (Wesson 1990).
But it does not do us much good if our nearest neigh-
bors are outside the observable Universe. The only ones
we can learn about must be within our past light cone.
In order to be visible, the ETIs must also have arisen
after the Big Bang, at a reasonably low redshift (say,
. 109). In bouncing or some inflationary cosmologies,
there may be ETIs in a previous universe, but these
are presumably hidden; in fact, a version of the Fermi
Paradox implies that evidence of technological societies
can only survive for a finite time (Tipler 1982). There
are then only a finite number NLC of birthsites within
this volume besides Earth; if terrestrial planets are as-
sumed to be the birthsites, then NLC ≈ 4.9 × 1020
(Zackrisson et al. 2016).
I shall say that we live in a crowded Universe if there
are other intelligent life forms within our past light cone
sometime between z = 103 and z = 0. In contrast, I will
say that we are isolated if there are no other intelligent
life forms in this region of spacetime. As long as the
birthsites evolve basically independently of each other,
and ignoring the time it takes for ETIs to evolve, the
probability that we are isolated for a particular PETI
can be found using the binomial distribution:
P(isolated|PETI) = (1− PETI)
NLC ≈ e−NLCPETI . (8)
The prior probability that we are isolated,
Pisolated =
∫ Πmax
0
P(isolated|PETI)
dPprior(PETI)
dΠ
dΠ
≈
1
Πmax
∫ Πmax
0
e−NLCe
1− eΠ
dΠ, (9)
does not have an obvious closed form expression, but it
is can be approximated to a precision of a few percent
as
Pisolated ≈
ln(1 + lnNLC)
ln(1− lnPmin)
(10)
thanks to the triple exponential.5 I use this approxima-
tion throughout this paper. The probability that we live
in a crowded Universe is
Pcrowded ≡ 1− Pisolated ≈ 1−
ln(1 + lnNLC)
ln(1 − lnPmin)
. (11)
2.3. A quantitative demonstration
Here is an example demonstrating how the log log
prior is responsive when the log prior is not because
of systematic errors.
5 Roughly speaking, y ≡ P (isolated|PETI) ≈ exp(−NLCPETI)
changes from 0 to 1 over a range of ∼ |dΠ/dy|y=0.5 = 3/(1.4 +
lnNLC) in Π.
Suppose we believe that the minimum chance life can
arise on a planet is 10−10
100
. According to the log log
prior, dPloglog/dΠ = 1/ ln(1 + 10
100 ln 10) = 1/231 (the
thick, dashed, black lines in Figure 1). According to a
flat log-prior, dPlog/d lnPETI = 1/(10100 × ln 10), so in
terms of Π, dPlog/dΠ = e
Π/(10100 × ln 10). As seen in
the left panel of Figure 2, the log prior’s weight (thick,
dashed, black lines) varies by ∼ 100 orders of magnitude
over the range of possible PETI. Compared to the log log
prior, it concentrates almost all of this weight near the
minimum possible PETI. For all possible values where
the Universe is likely to be crowded, dPlog/dΠ ≈ 10−100
(right panel of Figure 2).
Now imagine a survey that observes Nsurvey = 10
10
planets and is able to determine if they ever possessed in-
telligent life. (Note that, in reality, most societies might
be long dead by the time the planets are observed.) The
survey is reported to have found Nreport planets that
have hosted ETIs. Due to systematic errors, Nreport
need not be Nhost, the actual number of planets ob-
served that have hosted aliens. Instead, whatever Nhost
actually is, a glitch causes Nreport to be reported with
a probability of ε, while the correct Nhost is reported
with probability 1− ε. This glitch can give a false posi-
tive, a false negative, or even accidentally leave Nreport
unchanged. The likelihood of the reported observation
is
L(Nreport|PETI) = ε
+ (1− ε)Lbinomial(Nreport|Nsurvey,PETI), (12)
where Lbinomial(Nreport|Nsurvey,PETI) is the likelihood
that Nreport planets of Nsurvey host ETIs given some
PETI value according to the binomial distribution. The
binomial distribution likelihood is given by
lnLbinomial(Nreport|Nsurvey,PETI) = ln
(
Nsurvey
Nreport
)
+Nreport lnPETI + (Nsurvey −Nreport) ln(1 − PETI).
(13)
The posterior PDFs for PETI then follow from Bayes’
Theorem (equation 2).
The posteriors that result from using the log log prior
when Nreport = 1 and 0 are shown on the left and the
right of Figure 1. Generally, for the Nreport = 1 case,
the posterior has a spike near PETI ≈ 10−10, whereas
there is a steep drop at this point for the Nreport = 0
case. When there are no systematic errors, with ε = 0,
these are the only features (solid black lines). Increasing
systematic errors (grey through red lines) add a floor of
posterior weight. These errors suppress the probability
spike when the positive detection is reported, because of
the normalization term in Bayes’ Theorem.
Would these results convince us that PETI was near
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Figure 1. How the log log prior responds to a single detection of an extraterrestrial society (left) and a null result (right). The thick
black dashes show the log log prior itself. If there are no systematic errors (ε = 0), the posterior has the form shown by the solid black
line. Increasing systematic errors shift weight towards PETI values that contradict the observations. Results are shown for ε of 10
−10 (grey
dotted), 10−5 (blue solid), 10−4 (green solid), 10−3 (gold solid), and 10−2 (red solid).
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Figure 2. The weak response of the flat log prior to the discovery of an extraterrestrial society, showing the entire range of Π values (left)
and a close-up of Π ≤ 6 (right). The thick black dashes show the prior, and the thin solid black line is the posterior if ε = 0. Also shown
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10−10 ifNreport = 1? This is determined by the posterior
cumulative distribution function (CDF),
CDF(Π′) =
∫ Π′
0
dP (Π)
dΠ
dΠ, (14)
which determines how much of the posterior weight
is below a Π value. These functions are shown for
Nreport = 1 in Figure 3 (left panel). The shaded regions
represent credibility intervals containing 50% and 90%
of the posterior weight. If ε is small enough, the CDFs
reach ∼ 1 within the shown range, indicating that we
would conclude that a detection was correct. If ε is large,
& 10−4, however, the spike in the posterior PDF merely
adds a small step to the CDF that does not breach the
credibility intervals; our opinion on PETI is not changed
much from the original log log prior. The cumulative
increase in the CDF over the “spike” is nearly
∆CDF ≈ (1 − ε)
×
∫ Πmax
0
Lbinomial[Nreport|Nsurvey,PETI(Π)]
dPprior
dΠ
dΠ∫ Πmax
0
L[Nreport|Nsurvey,PETI(Π)]
dPprior
dΠ
dΠ
,
(15)
which is about [1 + ε(1 − ε)−1ΠmaxNfound[1 −
ln(Nfound/Nsurvey)]]
−1 if 1 . Nfound ≪ Nsurvey. Be-
cause Nreport ≪ Nsurvey, the survey actually could rule
out high values of PETI: this is seen as the steep cliffs
in the CDF when ε is small. If ε is large, though, the
survey does not rule out large PETI, since these could
be false negatives. This is the gist of arguments against
the Fermi Paradox, which apparently rules out other
technological societies in the Milky Way’s history, but
depends on uncertain assumptions about alien behavior
— we might assign some moderately high probability ε
to the possibility that they all stay on their home plan-
ets, or that their presence would be undetectable, blunt-
ing the paradox. Another example of this is seen in the
right panel, which shows the CDFs for Nreport = 0.
If there are no systematic errors, the log prior re-
sponds to the evidence well (solid black line in Figure 2),
showing a similarly sharp spike near PETI ≈ 10−10 for
Nreport = 1, but systematic errors wash away these fea-
tures rapidly. When the systematic errors are as small
as ε = 10−100 (dotted grey line), the spike seems basi-
cally unaffected, but the prior weights for other PETI are
not exponentially suppressed. This indicates that some
posterior weight has already been lost from the spike.
In fact, when the CDF is calculated, it climbs only to a
value of 0.3 in this region (Figure 4) — we would con-
clude that PETI is most likely far below 10−10. Decreas-
ing ε to 10−101 actually makes the detection credible
(dotted magenta line, inset), if not secure. But no real
survey could rule out systematic errors to this degree,
if only because of the possibility of fraud or outright
hallucination. Increasing ε to only 10−90 already sup-
presses the spike’s amplitude by a factor of 1010 (blue
lines). The CDF now plateaus at an insignificant value
of 10−10. While in a relative sense, this is still much
greater than the prior CDF value of ∼ 10−100, it still
amounts to disregarding the results in an absolute sense.
The stiffness of the log prior only grows with ε. When
ε = 10−10, which might be a very conservative estimate
for a real study, the CDF plateau has subsided to a mere
10−90. As with the log log prior, the errors also blunt
null results. The CDF for large PETI falls proportionally
to ε & 10−100, though it hardly matters since the CDF
was only ∼ 10−100 to start with. In this scenario, the
null result is entirely redundant; one is far more com-
mitted to the prior conclusion that there are no aliens
in our past light cone than to any data.
While this demonstration uses an extremely small
Pmin, it shows that the log log prior responds to
both positive and negative results, avoiding a poten-
tial pathology of the log prior. As noted above, actual
surveys would need to account for their efficiency at de-
tecting any ETIs who have ever lived. In addition, the
use of a single ε is a very simplistic model. More re-
alistically, one might use some function to assign the
probability that Nhost host planets will be reported as
Nreport detections.
3. ESTIMATES OF Pcrowded
The entropy of finite systems, and so the log log prior
has a reasonable cutoff for Pmin. The ultimate upper
bound on entropy is set by the cosmological constant;
there are only finitely many possible states for an ob-
servable Universe. It is unlikely that every last particle
in every last galaxy needs to be precisely arranged for
intelligence to evolve on a planet, though, motivating
more stringent bounds on the entropy. The entropy of
a biosphere is limited by the amount of mass near a
planet’s surface, and it may be sufficient for a single in-
telligent organism to appear, in which case the entropy
is bounded by the mass of an organism. Finally, we can
dispense with thermodynamic entropy altogether, since
it mostly measures variations on the molecular level, and
consider more abstract biological properties.
By default, I will assume that “birthsite” refers to
a terrestrial planet. From the Earth’s example, a bio-
sphere grows until it permeates the surface and ocean of
a planet, filling essentially all habitable volume. If the
evolution of intelligence is constrained by global prop-
erties of the biosphere — like which kinds of life prevail
— then a planetary biosphere is an appropriate choice
for a birthsite. But if the evolution of intelligence is
constrained by a few local events, we should consider
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Figure 4. The posterior CDF using the log prior for a single
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line in the inset is the CDF for ε = 10−101.
smaller, more numerous birthsites. These sites can be
individual sites for the origin of an ancestral protocell,
or individual speciation events of intelligent species. I
set some upper limits on the number of possible birthing
events in Section 3.5.
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Table 2. Log log prior estimates for Pcrowded
Entropy bound S Birthsite types Section
FGKTP TP C Max
Number of birthsites 2× 1019 4.9 × 1020 4× 1032 4× 10119
Cosmic 2.9 × 10122 0.0135 0.0138 0.0154 0.0199 3.1
Biosphere 1048 0.0345 0.0351 0.0392 0.0509 3.2
Organism 1029 0.0572 0.0582 0.0649 0.0842 3.2
Protocell 1012 0.138 0.141 0.157 0.203 3.2
Genome 4× 109 0.173 0.176 0.196 0.254 3.3
Proteome 3.3× 107 0.220 0.224 0.250 0.325 3.4
Protein shape 1.5× 105 0.320 0.326 0.363 0.472 3.4
Note—The birthsite types considered are terrestrial planets around F, G, and K dwarfs (FGKTPs),
terrestrial planets (TPs), comets (C), and the maximum number from the Margolus & Levitin
(1998) bound (Max).
3.1. Cosmological bounds on entropy: A lower bound
on Pcrowded
The Weak Copernican Principle follows from consid-
erations of fundamental physics that limit the entropy
of the observable Universe. These limits require no as-
sumptions about biology, and presumably could be de-
veloped by alien societies living in environments very
different from the Earth. The Bekenstein bound pro-
poses that a weakly gravitating, isolated system has a
maximum entropy of
Smax =
2πkBER
~c
, (16)
where E is the mass-energy of the system and R is the
radius of a sphere that can fully contain it (Bekenstein
1981). The covariant version of the bound is more gen-
eral and limits the entropy along null surfaces extending
from the boundary of any region that fulfills some gen-
eral conditions (Bousso 2002). The observable Universe
as a whole can be bounded by its cosmic particle hori-
zon (CPH) and cosmic event horizon (CEH), which can
serve as these null surfaces.
The particle horizon surrounds every location in space
that has ever been in the past light cone of the Earth.
The proper distance of the particle horizon at a time t
is
RCPH = ca(t)
∫ t
0
dt′
a(t′)
, (17)
where a(t′) is the scale factor of the Universe at a time
t′ (e.g., Davis & Lineweaver 2004). Then the covariant
Bekenstein bound limits the entropy along the past light
cone the CPH to less than (Bousso 2002)
SCPH ≤
kBc
3
G~
πR2CPH. (18)
According to the standard ΛCDM cosmology, the ob-
servable Universe also has an event horizon that sur-
rounds every location in spacetime that can send a sig-
nal that will ever reach the Earth. The proper dis-
tance of the cosmic event horizon at a time t is (as in
Davis & Lineweaver 2004):
RCEH = ca(t)
∫ ∞
t
dt′
a(t′)
. (19)
Event horizons, including the CEH have a max-
imal entropy, which is (Gibbons & Hawking 1977;
Egan & Lineweaver 2010)
SCEH =
kBc
3
G~
πR2CEH. (20)
The CEH entropy, 2.9× 10122kB, dwarfs the entropy of
everything else contained within the observable Universe
(as noted by Egan & Lineweaver 2010).
As long as dark energy is stable, the entropy of the
observable Universe can never be much greater than the
present SCEH. Therefore, we can use SCEH/kB for a
maximum value of the dimensionless entropy, Scosmic.
Then, according to the log log prior, the probability that
we are not isolated is 1.4% (Table 2). The odds highly
favor our being isolated, but not to the point that it is
an absurd hypothesis.
Since the log log prior could have been developed be-
fore there was compelling evidence for the cosmological
constant, or by aliens living in the distant past or future,
the log log prior is guaranteed to have a reasonable cutoff
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Figure 5. Time evolution of the maximum entropy contained in
the Universe’s particle (blue) and event (black) horizons, accord-
ing to the Bekenstein bound. The cosmologies considered are the
standard ΛCDM cosmology (solid), a quintessence cosmology with
w = −0.999 (dotted), a flat CDM cosmology with Ωm = 1 − Ωr
(short-dashed), and an open CDM cosmology with ΩΛ = 0 and
Ωm equal to its value in our Universe (medium dashed). H0 has
the same value in all cases.
only if lnScosmic doesn’t vary too much with the cosmol-
ogy. The evolution of SCEH for the ΛCDM cosmology
is plotted in Figure 5 as the solid black line. Its value
is stable into the indefinite future, and lnSCEH is only
∼ 10% smaller 1 year after the Big Bang. The particle
horizon (solid blue line) could have been used to set more
constraining limits on lnScosmic in the distant past, but
will not be an effective limit in the distant future. If the
smaller of both horizons is chosen, the horizon entropy
evolution only affects lnScosmic by ∼ 20%.
If dark energy is not a cosmological constant, the fu-
ture evolution of the cosmic event horizon will be dra-
matically different. Phantom dark energy (w < −1)
results in the event horizon collapsing as the Universe’s
scale factor approaches infinity in a finite time. Unless
w is minutely more than −1, the collapse affects lnSCEH
at the factor of 2 level only very close to the end (less
than 1 Myr). It is unlikely that an ETI would evolve
in this narrow window. If dark energy is quintessence
(−1 < w < −1/3), RCEH stalls at its current radius
for a short time, but ultimately starts growing linearly
with time (dotted black line in Figure 5). The value of
lnSCEH does not exceed twice its current value for over
1040 years, but it does grow without limit. It is possi-
ble that all baryonic matter will have decayed by then
(the effects of hypothetical proton decay are described
in Adams & Laughlin 1997 among others), so there will
be no ETIs drawing wildly divergent conclusions, but
the estimate is clearly not perfectly robust.
Until relatively recently, cosmologies without dark en-
ergy were plausible. These cosmologies lack an event
horizon, so the particle horizon would be the only limit
to the cosmic entropy. The dashed blue lines in Fig-
ure 5 show the evolution of the particle horizon entropy
in open and flat cosmologies without a cosmological con-
stant. Its value is basically the same as in ΛCDM until
the present and continues growing quadratically with
time into the distant future. Like the event horizon in
quintessence cosmology, lnSCPH grows slowly, remain-
ing within a factor of two for over 1040 years but never
stabilizing. The horizon entropy is therefore not a robust
limit on≫ 10100 year timescales in these cosmologies, if
anybody is around then.
The CPH may also be much bigger than the radii I cal-
culate here. In inflationary theories, comoving regions
much larger than the observable Universe were once in
our past light cone and fell out of contact due to a period
of exponential expansion (Harrison 1991). For ΛCDM
cosmology, the CEH should still bound the entropy of
the Universe, but it would be an issue if dark energy
decays away or if the Universe didn’t have it in the first
place.
Krauss & Scherrer (2007) questioned whether ob-
servers living in the distant future of our Universe
would even be able to derive ΛCDM cosmology (see also
Rothman & Ellis 1987). Red dwarf stars can shine for
over a trillion years, so it is conceivable that ETIs will
evolve in these late times on planets around these stars
(Loeb et al. 2016; Stevenson 2013 discusses the geologi-
cal difficulties in maintaining habitability for that long).
Since all distant galaxies would have vanished beyond
the event horizon by then, observers might conclude that
there is nothing beyond their own host galaxy, which is
sitting in an otherwise empty Universe. Although they
would know of no cosmic horizons, these observers could
still apply the Bekenstein bound to limit the entropy in
a sphere that safely contains their galaxy. In that way,
they would derive a lnScosmic that is not too different
from ln(SCEH/kB).
While fairly robust, the cosmological entropy bounds
are greatly overpowered. Most of the degrees of freedom
in the Universe play no role in the evolution of life or
intelligence, and can be neglected. More realistic esti-
mates of lnScosmic lead to higher estimates of Pcrowded.
3.2. The thermodynamic entropies of habitats and
Pcrowded
Actual organic life is made of chemical matter with
far less entropy than allowed under Bekenstein’s bound.
Common materials found in Earth’s biosphere have an
The Log Log SETI Prior 15
entropy of about 1 kB per baryon, as shown in Table 3
(Lodders & Fegley 1998). The actual specific entropy is
a few times larger for lightweight gases like molecular hy-
drogen, and smaller for complex molecules. Since living
things are mostly made of and live in liquid water, with
an entropy of 0.47 kB per baryon, I use 1 kB per baryon
as an upper estimate for their entropy.6 The maximum
dimensionless entropy of an organism or ecosystem of
mass M is then approximately
Smax ≈
M
amu
. (21)
Table 3. Molar entropies of selected materials
Material Formula m Phase S0 sb
(amu)
(
J
molK
)
Hydrogen H2 2.02 (g) 130.68 7.78
Helium He 4.00 (g) 126.15 3.79
Nitrogen N2 14.00 (g) 191.61 1.65
Oxygen O2 16.00 (g) 205.15 1.54
Methane CH4 16.04 (g) 186.26 1.40
Water H2O 18.02 (l) 69.95 0.47
(g) 188.84 1.26
Sodium Na+ 22.99 (a) 58.45 0.31
Ethane C2H6 30.07 (g) 229.60 0.92
Chlorine Cl− 35.45 (a) 56.60 0.19
Argon Ar 39.95 (g) 154.85 0.47
Carbon
dioxide
CO2 44.01 (g) 213.79 0.58
Halite NaCl 58.44 (s) 72.1 0.15
Calcium
carbonate
CaCO3 100.09 (s) 91.7 0.11
Note—The molecular mass is m and the molar entropy of the
material is S0. The entropy per baryon is sb ≡ S
0/(NAmkB).
Values are for standard temperature and pressure, from Table
1.21 of Lodders & Fegley (1998). The phases are (g) for gases,
(l) for liquids, (s) for solids, and (a) for solutions in water.
I consider three possible systems that might need to
evolve in order for an alien society to exist: a planet’s
biosphere, an individual organism, and a single proto-
cell.
Biological species evolve in response to their planetary
environment. They also depend on their environments
for sustenance. Technological societies capable of inter-
stellar communication require access to great amounts of
6 This is smaller than the Bekenstein bound by a factor of
R/(1 fm); the Compton wavelength of a nucleon is 1 fm.
materials and energy. The maximum number of exter-
nal factors in the planetary environment that could con-
tribute to the evolution of an alien society is given by the
chemical entropy of their host biosphere. On the Earth,
most of the biosphere lives in the hydrosphere, which has
a mass of 1.7×1024 g (Lodders & Fegley 1998). The en-
tropy of the hydrosphere and its environment is at most
4× 1047kB, which I round up to give a fiducial value of
Sbiosphere = 10
48. I then find Pcrowded is 3.5% (Table 2).
Of course, the evolution of an organism does not de-
pend on every degree of freedom in the biosphere, most
of which describe minute arrangements of individual,
distant molecules. The number of possible organisms is
limited by the entropy of an individual, suggesting this
provides a more realistic lower limit on the probability
that a planet will produce a given organism. Since a
human body has a mass of ∼ 100 kg, with an entropy of
∼ 6×1028 kB, I adopt a fiducial value of Sorganism = 10
29
for individual organisms. This entropy bound gives a
Pcrowded of 5.8% (Table 2).
Finally, it is possible that the rate limiting step for the
evolution of ETIs is the origin of life itself. The origin
of life has been hypothesized to be an extremely rare
event requiring a precise combination of molecules (e.g.,
Conway Morris 2003; Yockey 2000). I assume that the
worst case is that an entire protocell must be generated
from a thermal fluctuation. A protocell is presumably no
more massive than a modern prokaryote,∼ 5×1011 amu,
from the mean carbon mass of a prokaryote multiplied
by 10 to include its water (Whitman et al. 1998). Again
I round this up to the next power of 10 and arrive at
a maximum protocell entropy of Sprotocell = 1012. The
resulting log log prior estimate for the probability that
we are not isolated is 14% (Table 2).
It is unlikely that the probability an organism evolves
on a planet is as small as implied by its chemical en-
tropy. Thermal fluctuations in the planetary environ-
ment are expected to produce organisms at least that
often, subject to the availability of materials and inter-
nal energy. PETI is as low as these Pmin if we appeared
as thermal fluctuations; in effect, we would be Boltz-
mann brains. While that’s possible under the laws of
physics, the memories of Boltzmann brains are unreli-
able since they are also the result of the random fluc-
tuations rather than actual life of the organism. All of
our knowledge, including that leading to the conclusion
that we arose from random fluctuations, would then be
completely unrelated to the external world, so adopt-
ing this conclusion is self-defeating (as in cosmology,
Albrecht & Sorbo 2004). On a philosophical basis, we
probably have to assume the likelihood we exist is much
greater. The Boltzmann brain problem does not apply
to the protocell entropy estimate, however. It does not
matter if the internal state of a protocell reflects its his-
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tory, as long as its descendents include sentient beings
with memories that are reliable.
Since the number of possible living beings is limited
by the entropy of an individual organism, is there any
point to using the biosphere and cosmic entropy esti-
mates? While they almost certainly overestimate the
number of relevant factors, they are in a sense more ro-
bust, since organisms are not closed thermal reservoirs.
Not all microstates are equally likely, since an organism
can self-correct and radiate away “errors” into the sur-
rounding environment (as in Lloyd 2000). For example,
one could imagine the natural state of an ecosystem is
an ocean filled with just one species of cells that have
no mutations because they use error correction mecha-
nisms. In order for multicellular organisms to appear,
some external factor would have to disrupt this ecosys-
tem. Or consider our own planet: in most microstates,
there is no widespread life. Yet, life will continue to
thrive on the Earth despite the smaller number of mi-
crostates where this happens, barring some catastrophe
inflicted from the outside, because the Earth is not a
closed system. In addition, microstates can be blocked
because of energetic barriers that prevent certain chem-
ical reactions.
Life also needs certain elements in order to exist. Con-
served quantities like electric charge cannot be altered
by thermal fluctuations. The amount of each element in
a biosphere is also effectively conserved. A pure water
ocean that contained no carbon could not give rise to
life. Although it is hypothetically possible to form nec-
essary elements through pycnonuclear reactions, these
rates are very slow (Adams & Laughlin 1997). The lim-
ited lifespan of a planet without the necessary elements
for life would have a much smaller PETI than implied
by Sorganism. Finally, if chemicals are dilutely spread
throughout an ocean, they must be concentrated into a
small region in order to form into an organism.
At the very least, one would probably have to con-
sider whether the astrophysical environment of a planet
is compatible with life. Of course, most of the micro-
scopic details of the sun are irrelevant for life, and the
amount of extra entropy introduced by fine tuning the
star’s bulk properties is insignificant compared to the
chemical entropies. After all, life must be robust to sur-
vive, and not easily killed because of some minor thermal
fluctuation in the sun.
While these problems are unlikely to occur in practice,
they provide a philosophical basis for using the larger
entropy estimates as very conservative limits on Sall.
3.3. The entropy of the human genome: A best
estimate for Pcrowded
A common line of argument against the existence of
aliens is that it is unlikely that Homo sapiens would
evolve on a different planet (Simpson 1964; Mayr 2001;
Lineweaver 2009). The probability that this would hap-
pen is bounded by the number of possible species of
DNA-based organisms, assuming DNA-based organisms
are fairly common. A species can be defined by its
genome, and the amount of information defines a ge-
netic entropy. The genetic entropy Sgenome provides the
most reasonable bound on Sall, as long as life frequently
arises on planets (more often than 1 in eSgenome).
The genome of a DNA based organism consists of a se-
quence of ℓbp base pairs, each of which is either adenine,
cytosine, guanine, or thymine (uracil when transcribed
into RNA) on one strand of the DNA. The other strand
of the DNA then usually has thymine, guanine, cyto-
sine, or adenine, respectively. The human genome has
3 × 109 base pairs (Venter et al. 2001; Abdellah et al.
2004). The DNA is interpreted according to a genetic
code, with each three letter combination of base pairs
(codon) corresponding to an amino acid. These amino
acids are assembled into proteins according to the se-
quence of codons in the genome (Crick 1968). Earth
life mostly uses 20 amino acids, and two codons are re-
served to signal the starting point and ending point of
a gene. However, many other amino acids exist; the
genetic code that arises on different planets could map
any codon to any amino acid, leading to vastly different
organisms from the same DNA sequence.
The genome entropy of Homo sapiens is given by
Sgenome = lnNsequence + lnNcodes + | lnPlength|
+ lnNexpression − lnNindividuals, (22)
with Nsequence being the number of possible DNA se-
quences with a length ℓbp, Ncodes is the number of pos-
sible genetic codes, Plength is the probability that an
organism has a genome with length ℓbp, Nexpression is
the number of possible ways to express genes in all the
cells of the body, and Nindividual is the number of pos-
sible DNA sequences that are part of a typical species.
Almost all of the entropy derives from the information
in the DNA sequences themselves. If each base pair is
chosen independently, the number of possible sequences
is given by
lnNsequence = ℓbp ln 4 = 4× 10
9, (23)
which is 4 × 109 for Homo sapiens. If there are Namino
amino acids that can be assigned randomly and indepen-
dently to triplet base pair codons, the number of genetic
codes is given by
lnNcodes = 4
3 lnNamino. (24)
Even if Namino is ∼ 1, 000, and extraterrestrial genetic
codes have > 4 nucleotides (Baross et al. 2007) and > 3
base pairs per codon (e.g., Anderson et al. 2004), the
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genetic code entropy can be ignored. The length of the
genome of a human-like organism is bounded to ≪ 1013
simply by the number of baryons in a typical cell (from
the cell counts in Bianconi et al. 2013). As a worst case,
if each possible length between 1 and 1013 is equally
likely, Plength = 10−13. Therefore, the length of the
genome makes an insignificant contribution to Sgenome.
The behavior of a cell can vary greatly depending on
how the genes encoded in the DNA are expressed. Dif-
ferent combinations of gene expression lead to differ-
ent types of body cells. Suppose an organism contains
Ncelltypes types of cells, and its genome includes Ngenes
genes that can be in Nswitch states. Then the number of
possible combinations is given by
lnNexpression = NcelltypesNgenes lnNswitch. (25)
The human body starts from Ncelltypes = 1 type of
cell, the zygote, and grows into an adult with at least
411 distinct cell types (Vickaryous & Hall 2006). The
genome codes Ngenes ≈ 2.2× 104 genes (Abdellah et al.
2004). A value of Nswitch = 2 is enough for an enor-
mous diversity of cell expressions, as noted by Kauffman
(1995). I will use lnNswitch = 1 as a generic value,
but even if Nswitch = 1, 000, lnNswitch would increase
by only a factor of ∼ 7. These values imply that
lnNexpression ≈ 2 × 10
4–9 × 106, a ∼ 0.2% correction
on the genetic entropy that I neglect.
To estimate the number of possible individuals in a
species, I assume that a fraction ̟ of the base pairs
in an individual’s genome can differ from some baseline
sequence. This fraction measures the genetic variability
in a species. I ignore any considerations of where those
variations may occur in the genome; an individual is part
of a species as long as there are ≤ ̟ℓbp differences from
the baseline sequence. Each mutation can be to one of
3 base pairs. Thus, the number of possible individuals
is
Nindividual =
̟ℓbp∑
i=0
3i
(
ℓbp
i
)
< ̟ℓbp3
̟ℓbp
(
ℓbp
̟ℓbp
)
. (26)
Humans today have relatively little genetic diver-
sity, with ̟ . 0.1%, but this is a lower limit on
the possible diversity within Homo sapiens (Li & Sadler
1991; Sachidananam et al. 2001). An upper limit on
̟ comes from the divergence of the human genome
from the genomes of chimpanzees and bonobos, which is
∼ 1.2–1.3% (Mikkelsen et al. 2005; Pru¨fer et al. 2012).
I adopt a value of 1%, so that lnNindividual . 0.067×(3×
109) = 2×108. This is a minor correction to lnNsequence
that I ignore.
The human body is home to trillions of microbes
(Sender et al. 2016), each potentially having its own
genome. Some of these microbes may be vital to the
body’s functions (Turnbaugh et al. 2007). I ignore their
contribution, though, since working out which ones are
needed and the distinctiveness of their genomes is far
beyond the scope of this work.
If the entropy is capped at Sgenome = 4 × 109, the
log log prior implies that there is an 18% chance that
we are not isolated. This is my best estimate — more
likely than not, we are alone in the observable Universe,
but the possibility that aliens exist within our past light
cone is a reasonable one.
3.4. The proteome entropy and generous estimates for
Pcrowded
The genes coded in DNA represent proteins, which
actually are responsible for most biological func-
tions. The great majority of the DNA is non-coding
(Abdellah et al. 2004), however, and so might not af-
fect the organism’s traits. Instead, the phenotype of an
organism may be dependent on its proteome, the collec-
tion of proteins encoded in its genes and the ways those
proteins are expressed in its cells (Wilkins et al. 1996).
I make higher estimates of Pcrowded from the proteome
entropy.
We can calculate the proteome entropy as
Sproteome = Ncoded lnNproteins + lnNexpression, (27)
where Nproteins is the number of different proteins pos-
sible, Ncoded & Ngenes is the number of proteins coded
into the genome, and Nexpression is the number of gene
expression patterns. The proteins, which are first syn-
thesized as chains of amino acids, can be enumerated:
lnNproteins = ℓprotein lnNamino ≈ 500 ln20. (28)
About 3.4 × 107 base pairs in the human genome code
protein sequences, for a mean gene length of ∼ 1, 500
base pairs, or a mean protein length of ∼ 500 amino
acids (Abdellah et al. 2004). With 22, 000 genes, and
assuming 1 protein per gene (although this ratio is prob-
ably larger in practice; Wilkins et al. 1996), there are up
to exp(3.3× 107) possible combinations of proteins pos-
sible for a proteome the size of ours. I previously found
2×104–9×106 for lnNexpression, so the proteome entropy
is dominated by the first term.
The proteome entropy of Sproteome = 3.3×107 is about
1% of Sgenome, as might be expected since ∼ 1% of the
human genome codes proteins (Abdellah et al. 2004).
Using this value slightly raises Pcrowded to 22%, leaving
the basic conclusion of the previous section unchanged.
Even more abstractly, it’s possible that only the basic
shape of a protein matters for its function, not the ac-
tual sequence of amino acids in the proteins (Dill 1999;
Dryden et al. 2008). The actual number of possible
shapes Nshape seems to be quite low: Lau & Dill (1990)
proposed a reduced sequence space with ∼ 1020 possible
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varieties, and Dill (1999) argued that there are perhaps
∼ 1010 functionally distinct structures. The actual num-
ber of basic shapes might be a few thousand for a protein
domain, where most proteins are built out of just a few
of these domain units (Rose et al. 2006). I will consider
an extremely low value of Nshape = 1, 000. In addition,
patterns of gene expression still add lnNexpression. Fol-
lowing this line of thought,
Sshape = Ncoded lnNshape +NcelltypesNgenes lnNswitch
≈ 1.5× 105. (29)
This most liberal estimate leads to Pcrowded values of
33%. The protein shape entropy should be regarded as
highly speculative, since it ignores all actual chemistry.
In principle, there could be a phenotype entropy de-
scribing the combinations of possible body traits while
ignoring everything on the biochemical level. If the
phenotype entropy is small enough, the Universe being
crowded is favored by the prior; Sphenotype = 100 implies
Pcrowded ≈ 84%, for example. Using it requires a way
to enumerate “body traits”, which is beyond the scope
of this work. The trait list would also have to be fine-
grained enough to not simply assume that intelligence
is common (c.f. the “skeleton space” in Conway Morris
2003): equation 4 assumes the worst case is that each
combination of traits is equiprobable, which is clearly
not the case if the only trait we consider is “has a big
brain”. Also, a phenotype entropy would apply only if
complex multicellular organisms evolve frequently, or if
the state space includes a lot of parameters describing
individual cell morphologies, to account for the prob-
ability that single-celled organisms do not evolve into
complex multicellular life forms. Lastly, for phenotype
entropy to be useful, the evolution of intelligence must
not depend on any of the details of the organism’s bio-
chemistry.
3.5. What if birthsites are much smaller than planets?
Both NLC and Sall affect the calculated Pcrowded. Al-
though I have been assuming that the birthsites for ETIs
are the entire histories of whole planets, that may not
be appropriate.
Within the Solar System, the moons Europa, Titan,
and Enceladus are fairly widely considered to be possi-
ble habitats for life (Chyba & Hand 2005; Lammer et al.
2009; Lunine 2009). In addition, liquid water oceans
plausibly existed (or still exist) in the larger icy moons
and Kuiper Belt objects (Hussmann et al. 2006). Hab-
itable regions may have existed in large carbonaceous
asteroids early in the Solar System’s history, mak-
ing them a conceivable, but remote habitat for life
(Abramov & Mojzsis 2011). Dyson (2003) has even pro-
posed that non-Earthlike life could evolve in the Kuiper
Belt. All of these worlds in principle could raise the
number of world habitats in the Solar System to dozens,
although they may have too little free energy or insuf-
ficient materials to support complex life (Lammer et al.
2009).
A very generous estimate could be that every body
in the Solar System that is at least ∼ 1 km wide is
a possible birthsite. By number, most of these bodies
are comets in the Oort Cloud, where there are perhaps
∼ 1013 of them (e.g., Weissman 1996). To extrapolate
this estimate to other star systems, I assume that the
number of comet birthsites scales with the mass of the
host star: a stellar population of mass M⋆ hosts NLC =
1013(M⋆/M⊙) birthsites.
As shown in Table 2, including all comets as birth-
sites raises Pcrowded somewhat, to 1.5% to 36%. This
slight increase comes from the fact that NLC increases
from ∼ 1021 ≈ 1010
1.3
to ∼ 1033 ≈ 1010
1.5
. But this
apparent optimism comes with a price: about 3/4 of
the weight in Pcrowded now comes from scenarios where
more than one ETI arises per star system. About half
of the weight is for PETI & 10−4, for which our Solar
System would have hosted & 108 species of intelligent
life. This is in dire contradiction with the null results of
SETI and the lack of evidence for widespread interplane-
tary migration. The prior probability that the Universe
is crowded but the Solar System is not, with . 1 ETI
arising per M⊙ of stars, is reduced to a few percent.
If the main bottleneck for the appearance of intelli-
gence is the origin of life, the number of birthsites might
increase vastly further still. It could be that every pool,
every rock, every bubble provides an independent oppor-
tunity for the origin of life. When the chance of aliens
evolving is just the chance of any life appearing at all,
every new chance for abiogenesis must be considered a
birthsite.
Additional birthsites may also be located at different
times in the Solar System’s evolution, not just differ-
ent places. As the Sun expands into a red giant, many
of the outer icy worlds will become warm enough for
surface liquid water oceans (Lopez et al. 2005). Titan,
especially, may evolve from a world that could host
hypothetical methane dwelling life-forms to one host-
ing completely independent water dwelling life-forms
(Lorenz et al. 1997). A world can also host many birth-
sites, with multiple chances to play out life’s evolu-
tion, if mass extinctions devastate it frequently and if
the bottlenecks occur late in evolution (C´irkovic´ et al.
2009). Early in the Earth’s history, life may have arisen
many times after being repeatedly destroyed by impacts
(Sleep et al. 1989). If the development of ETIs requires
a particularly robust kind of life prevailing in the bio-
sphere, then Earth may have had several opportunities
to develop it.
The highest estimate for the number of birthsites
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in the Universe is provided by the Margolus & Levitin
(1998) (ML98) bound, a limit on how fast the quantum
state of a system can change. This is a necessary require-
ment for any kind of dynamics, including biological pro-
cesses. We can divide the Universe at any given moment
into subsystems which may serve as birthplaces for life:
these can be as large as the entire observable Universe or
as small as individual baryons. According to the ML98
bound, the rate of dynamics is limited to ΓM ≤ 2∆E/h,
where ∆E is the average difference between the inter-
nal energy of the system and its ground state energy
(Margolus & Levitin 1998). Then the number of birth-
sites in a region of spacetime is found by integrating each
system’s ΓM over its volume and adding them together.
Since ΓM is linear in energy, the total number of birth-
sites is directly proportional to the amount of internal
energy in the region. For cold systems like planets and
stars with masses of M , ∆E < Mc2. Within the past
light cone, the baryonic birthsite number is below
NmaxLC =
∫ 103
0
8π
3
D3C(z)ρ
com
b (z)c
2
h
(
dt
dz
)
dz = 4.3×10119,
(30)
where DC(z) is the comoving distance of an object
observed at redshift z along the past light cone and
ρcomb = Ωb×3H
2
0/(8πG)×(ΩΛ+Ωm(1+z)
3+Ωr(1+z)
4)
is the comoving baryonic density (Hogg 1999).
The values for Pcrowded now range from 2% to 47%
(Table 2), about twice the values expected for terrestrial
planet birthsites. The relatively limited effect is because
10120 is still only ∼ 1010
2
, compared to the Pmin val-
ues of 10−10
5
or less; ln ln 10120 isn’t much bigger than
ln ln 1021.
If birthsites did not interfere with each other, then
virtually all of the weight in Pcrowded is for scenarios
where there is more than one intelligent species per ter-
restrial planet, as with the cometary birthsite case. In
fact, of the crowded Universe scenarios, about half of
the weight is for PETI & 10
−10, naively implying ∼ 1090
ETIs per planet. The prior probability that the Uni-
verse is crowded but not every planet is packed with
intelligences is just ∼ 0.1%. But interaction between
birthsites can reduce the number of intelligent species
that actually appear on a planet. Even if life originates
a great number of times on a world, only one biosphere
may result, either through merger and symbiosis or elim-
ination and competition.
One can also consider more restrictive definitions of
birthsites. Zackrisson et al. (2016) estimates that most
terrestrial planets orbit red dwarfs. The habitable lifes-
pan of such planets might greatly exceed the age of the
Universe (Stevenson 2013), and their PETI values may
include intelligences that won’t evolve for tens of billions
of years. If one only considers those orbiting F, G, or
K dwarfs to be potential habitats, then the number of
birthsites falls to NLC = 2 × 1019. While the resulting
Pcrowded values are slightly smaller, the decrease is of
order ∼ 0.3% (total) or ∼ 3% (relative) (Table 2).
3.6. A note on small probabilities
The probabilities considered for Pmin defy our normal
intuitions, being vastly smaller than the probabilities
of many situations that seem to violate common sense.
Rare astronomical phenomena, like nearby gamma-ray
bursts, are not so rare compared to these kinds of odds.
Likewise, whatever the odds are for panspermia, the
transfer of life between planets, they are probably high
enough that its entropy cost is relatively small (e.g.,
Napier 2004; Worth et al. 2013). A transfer of life from
Mars to Earth already is a widely considered possibil-
ity (e.g., Davies 2003), but transfers between the Earth
and the outer Solar System, across interstellar space,
or passing back and forth between the inner planets a
hundred times would not dent the protocellular entropy.
By itself, this does not mean panspermia is likely — if
life is equally likely to arise and thrive on the Earth as
the other worlds, then it probably started here. But if
other worlds were much more conducive to forming life
for some reason, these greater probabilities could eas-
ily offset the low probability that life would survive a
transfer between a distant world and the Earth. For ex-
ample, Lunine & Nolan (1992) hypothesized that Triton
had a thick hydrogen atmosphere shortly after its cap-
ture by Neptune, a bit like the simulated atmosphere in
the Urey-Miller experiment (see Chyba & Hand 2005).
If that chemical environment increased the probability
of a limiting step from 10−200 on Earth to 10−100, for
example, a Triton origin for life would not be so implau-
sible.
Or we can go much further. One issue that makes
chemical evolution difficult is that the synthesis of dif-
ferent chemicals favors different environments, and the
reaction products tend to interfere with one another
(Conway Morris 2003; Baross et al. 2007). That diffi-
culty might be evaded by placing the production sites
far away from each other, even on different planets (c.f.,
Conway Morris 2003, quoting a thought experiment by
Robert Shapiro). Maybe on early Earth there was a pool
that formed ribose, and it just so happened that a me-
teorite from a planet in a different star system delivered
uracil to the pool, and coincidentally a meteorite from
a guanine planet landed at the same time in the same
pool, and coincidentally a meteorite from an adenine
planet landed there too, and coincidentally that’s when
a meteorite from a cytosine planet landed there, allowing
these ingredients to mix into RNA. It sounds silly, but
if there are such planets, this scenario is still probably
more likely than a protocell arising through thermal fluc-
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tuations. As the probability falls, the number of bizarre
paths to life increases, and it becomes essentially impos-
sible to prove that there’s only one thermodynamically
unlikely way for life to arise.
4. THE REACH AND GRASP OF SETI SURVEYS
The log log prior can inform judgments about which
SETI surveys are effective. While in principle we cannot
conclusively say that we’re isolated until we thoroughly
check every habitat in our past light cone, we can be
fairly convinced even if we check a fairly small fraction of
them, simply because it’s unlikely that PETI happens to
lie very near N−1LC . Instead, we simply have to constrain
most of the prior’s weight before our opinion changes
much — that is when the posterior will start to diverge
from the prior.
SETI surveys observe Ntargets targets and look for
some trace of a technological society. However, it’s im-
portant to distinguish between the reach of a survey and
its grasp. In this discussion, reach measures how many
targets it observes, regardless of the survey efficiency. I
define the weighted reach as the weight assigned to hy-
potheses where P−1ETI ≤ Ntargets. For how much prior
weight would the survey find a society if all societies
that ever evolved left a detectable trace? This can be
estimated as
R =
ln(1 + lnNtargets)
ln(1 + lnNLC)
. (31)
The maximum possible R is 1.
Grasp, as I define it, is how much of the prior weight
could be ruled out if nothing is found:
G =
∫ ΠLC
0
L(PETI|discovery)
dPprior
dΠ
dΠ (32)
The posterior P posteriorcrowded is then (1 − G)P
prior
crowded after a
null result. The likelihood here is the estimated proba-
bility that at least one society will be found for a given
value of PETI. It is different from reach because not
all ETIs necessarily leave an observable trace. First, we
usually are uncertain about whether ETIs leave a given
trace at all. This uncertainty is systematic. For exam-
ple, whether or not aliens can build megastructures is
uncertain; if megastructures are completely impossible,
we will never find any no matter how many targets we
search or how big PETI is. In analogy with Section 2.3,
let εtrace be the subjective probability that aliens never
leave a trace visible to the survey.
Second, there is a statistical factor η that measures
the detection efficiency of a survey. This factor might
be parameterized as η = ηvisibleηtime, where ηvisible is
the actual fraction of societies that ever leave a given
trace and ηtime is the fraction of the traces ever pro-
duced that would be visible now. The former factor
could actually be greater than 1 if societies replicate
by interstellar travel, although it increases the survey’s
grasp only if the progenitor society would not have been
visible in the original survey (Brin 1983). The latter
factor is roughly the ratio of the trace’s lifespan and the
Universe’s age. An analogy can be made with Drake’s
equation: ηvisible corresponds to fc, the probability that
an intelligent species forms a communicative society, and
ηtime corresponds to the lifetime of the society. Note
that a trace’s lifetime may not equal the society’s life-
time — either because the artifacts outlast the society
(Corbet 1997; Carrigan 2012), or because the society
is visible only for a short phase of its existence (Sagan
1973).
After accounting for these factors,
G = (1−εtrace)
[
1−
∫ ΠLC
0
L(PETI|null result)
dPprior
dΠ
dΠ
]
,
(33)
remembering that εtrace = 0 means complete certainty
that some intelligent lifeforms leave an observable trace
and εtrace = 1 means the possibility is too far-fetched to
consider. Plugging in the log log prior,
G ≈ (1 − εtrace)
ln[1 + ln(ηNtargets)]
ln(1 + lnNLC)
, (34)
if ηNtargets & 1. Note that if ηNtargets ≫ 1, G de-
pends very weakly on η — systematic uncertainties are
far more effective at reducing the grasp. It’s possible to
construct more advanced models, where the εtrace factor
is replaced by some prior over possible values of η.
The grasp requires subjective assessments that are be-
yond the scope of the paper, but the weighted reaches
of SETI surveys is easy to calculate. These are listed
in Table 4. According to the log log prior, the first few
orders of magnitude provide more weight than the rest.
With the fiducial number of terrestrial planet birthsites,
R = 0.5 is achieved in a survey of 700 (1, 700) stars
(F, G, or K dwarfs) expected to host 400 (300) ter-
restrial planets. Thus, according to the log log prior,
if the Universe is crowded, we expect the nearest re-
mains of intelligent lifeforms to be in the Milky Way
(R = 0.8). Additionally, an examination of just one
world beyond Earth effectively has a weighted reach of
order ln[1 − ln(1/2)] = 0.1, as long as it is a potential
habitat.
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Table 4. Weighted reaches of some SETI surveys
Survey Method Number of stars R Notes
FGK Any FGKTPs TPs C Max
Solar System Inspection 1 1 0.194 0.191 0.792 0.964 (a)
META (Type 0 beacons) Radio 15 119 0.176 0.420 0.817 0.968 (b)
GBT Kepler field Radio 86 86 0.445 0.437 0.822 0.968 (c)
STACEE Optical 187 187 0.393 0.442 0.827 0.969 (d)
HRMS / Project Phoenix Radio 1, 000 1, 000 0.476 0.510 0.838 0.970 (e)
Earth 2000 Optical 6, 176 6, 176 0.535 0.560 0.847 0.971 (f)
HabCat Radio 17, 129 17, 129 0.576 0.595 0.854 0.972 (g)
Kepler Artifact 140, 000 150, 000 0.631 0.645 0.866 0.974 (h)
Carrigan (2009) Artifact 1× 106 8× 106 0.673 0.717 0.882 0.976 (i)
META (Type 1 beacons) Radio 1× 107 8× 107 0.716 0.752 0.893 0.978 (b)
Milky Way Isolation 1.8× 1010 1.5× 1011 0.818 0.837 0.928 0.983 (j)
Annis (1999) Artifact 3× 1012 2× 1013 0.871 0.884 0.947 0.987 (k)
META (Type 2 beacons) Radio 4× 1012 3× 1013 0.875 0.887 0.949 0.987 (b)
Zackrisson et al. (2015) Artifact 3× 1013 2.0× 1014 0.892 0.902 0.956 0.988 (l)
Gˆ Artifact 1.8× 1015 1.5× 1016 0.927 0.933 0.971 0.991 (m)
Galaxy Zoo Artifact 1.8× 1016 1.5× 1017 0.944 0.949 0.979 0.993 (n)
Lacki (2016) Artifact 6.6× 1016 5.3× 1017 0.953 0.957 0.983 0.994 (o)
Olson (2015) Isolation 1.3× 1018 1.0× 1019 0.973 0.975 0.993 0.995 (p)
Table 4 continued
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Table 4 (continued)
Survey Method Number of stars R Notes
FGK Any FGKTPs TPs C Max
Note—The intra-Galactic surveys typically report the number of stars they observe, whereas the extragalactic surveys
report the number of galaxies examined or are distance limited. To convert into the number of birthsites, I use the
present-day stellar mass function from Table 1 of Chabrier (2003). I find there are 2.5 M dwarfs (masses between
0.08 and 0.6 M⊙) per M⊙ of stellar population, and their mean mass is 0.22 M⊙; there are 0.37 F, G, or K (FGK)
dwarfs (stars with masses between 0.6 and 1.2 M⊙, not adjusting for those off the main sequence) per M⊙, and their
mean mass is 0.83 M⊙. When an extragalactic distance is given, I use a mean stellar density of 2.3×10
8 M⊙ Mpc
−3
(comoving) from Baldry et al. (2012). When only the number of galaxies observed is given, I assume that all of the
galaxies have the stellar mass of the Milky Way, 5×1010 M⊙ (as quoted in Zackrisson et al. 2016). Then, according
to Zackrisson et al. (2016), there are 0.064 terrestrial planets per M⊙ of F, G, or K dwarfs (FGKTPs), and 1.5
terrestrial planets per M⊙ of F, G, K, or M dwarf (TPs) for this IMF.
The number of cometary (C) birthsites is 1013 per M⊙ of stellar population mass. I compute the number of maximal
(Max) birthsites directly from the stellar population masses, not attempting to include non-stellar mass or exclude
non-planetary mass, and I use stellar ages of 12 Gyr (except for the Solar System).
aI count Mercury, Venus, and Mars as the terrestrial planets, excluding Earth because of anthropic bias. For the
number of maximal birthsites, I use an age of 4.56 Gyr.
bMETA was an all-sky survey for narrowband radio emission (Horowitz & Sagan 1993). The “types” of beacons refer
to Kardashev (1964)’s scale. These reaches apply for radio beacons that radiate continuously and isotropically. For
Type 0 and Type I beacons, Horowitz & Sagan (1993) estimates the number of “Sun-like” stars that could have
been detected. I take this to mean the number of F, G, and K dwarfs, and I convert it into a total stellar mass. For
Type II beacons, I extrapolate from the given range of 22 Mpc.
c Siemion et al. (2013) used the Green Bank Telescope to look for artificial radio emission from 86 Kepler field stars
known to have exoplanets. I assume each of these stars hosts 1 terrestrial planet.
dSTACEE, a Cherenkov gamma-ray telescope, observed Solar-like stars in the HabCat catalog while waiting for
optimal times to observe its main target. Because it detects gamma rays through the Cherenkov light their particle
showers produced, it is sensitive to optical flashes characteristic of laser light (Hanna et al. 2009).
eHRMS was a canceled microwave SETI project that aimed to observe 1, 000 Solar-like stars. Project Phoenix, a
private successor project, used a catalog of 2, 000 stars and observed about 200 per year (Turnbull & Tarter 2003).
fEarth 2000 was a dedicated optical SETI project that targeted Solar-like stars (Howard et al. 2004).
gThe HabCat is a selection of Solar-like stars that are intended to be examined by radio SETI surveys
(Turnbull & Tarter 2003).
hKepler searches for natural exoplanets by detecting flux variations when they eclipse their host star, but it could
detect transiting artifical structures too (Arnold 2005). Of the 150,000 highest priority stars observed, about 140,000
are F, G, K, or A dwarfs (Batalha et al. 2010). KIC 8462852 undergoes anomalous eclipses, demonstrating that
unusual transits could be noticed in the Kepler photometry (Boyajian et al. 2016; an artificial explanation was noted
in Wright et al. 2016).
i Carrigan (2009) examined sources in the IRAS catalogs to see if they were Dyson spheres within the Milky Way.
The survey should have been sensitive to a volume including 106 Solar-like stars, from which I extrapolate the stellar
population mass.
jThe Fermi Paradox is frequently phrased as a limit on the number of societies that have arisen in our Galaxy from
the lack of starfarers in the Solar System.
kAnnis (1999) verified that 137 galaxies lied on the Tully-Fisher relation. If their stellar populations were mostly
cloaked in Dyson spheres, they would be optically faint for their stellar mass.
l Zackrisson et al. (2015) looked for outliers on the Tully-Fisher relation among 1, 359 galaxies.
mThe Gˆ project examined extended sources in the WISE catalog for mid-infrared thermal emission from galaxies with
stars cloaked in Dyson spheres. Griffith et al. (2015) found no galaxies with ≥ 85% of their starlight captured by
Dyson spheres, with a projected reach of 105 galaxies.
nThe Galaxy Zoo project is not associated with SETI, but in principle it could search for galaxies with anomalous
morphologies that might result from cosmic engineering. Volunteers have inspected about 106 galaxies (Lintott et al.
2011).
oLacki (2016) searched the Planck Catalog of Compact Sources 2 for microwave thermal emission from Type III
societies that have shrouded entire galaxies behind cold screens.
pOlson (2015) sets limits on the number of Type III–IV societies expanding through the cosmos from their non-
presence in the Milky Way. As an example, I use a comoving volume calculated from the mean limit on R1, for the
non-catastrophic evolution model with an expansion speed of 0.3c.
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Radio and optical surveys for societies like our own
have significant reaches. The stars in the HabCat list
of SETI Institute targets, for example, have a weighted
reach of ∼ 0.6 (Turnbull & Tarter 2003). Furthermore,
these modes of communication are feasible even with our
own level of technology, at least for reaching the near-
est stars (e.g., Howard et al. 2004; Loeb & Zaldarriaga
2007). The problem with these methods is their grasp.
It is possible that most societies self-destruct while
young, or that they are interested in communicating
with societies like our own for a very short time win-
dow (Sagan 1963, 1973; Bates 1978). Since our own
society is so young, we cannot rule out that ηtime ≈
(100 yr)/(10 Gyr) ≈ 10−8, for example. This concern
has been voiced for decades in the context of the lifes-
pan in Drake’s equation (Sagan 1963). Even a facility
as powerful as the Square Kilometer Array may not be
sensitive enough to detect radio transmissions from so-
cieties like our own (Forgan & Nichol 2011).
Surveys for alien megastructures and societies that
rate Type II or III on Kardashev (1964)’s scale have very
high reach. The recent Gˆ survey has a reach of ∼ 0.9
(Griffith et al. 2015). Similar reaches are achieved by
surveys for Type II radio beacons (Horowitz & Sagan
1993) and very cold waste heat from Type III societies
(Lacki 2016), and from the observation that intergalactic
travelers are not here (Olson 2015). Furthermore, Type
III societies are presumably long-lived simply because
it takes so much time to cross a galaxy and engineer it
(Kardashev 1985; Wright et al. 2014b; Zackrisson et al.
2015; Lacki 2016). But the grasp of such surveys is
very uncertain. Megastructures are huge extrapolations
from our technology, and require astronomical invest-
ments. Thus, there is a high systematic uncertainty to
their existence, a large value of εtrace. If we estimate
εtrace = 0.5, these surveys can have less grasp than one
confined to the Milky Way with εtrace ≈ 0 and η ≈ 1.
An ideal survey would search for traces of technol-
ogy on par with our own that survive for a long time.
It need not have a maximal reach to have a competi-
tive grasp. Arguably, these conditions are fulfilled by
a search for interstellar probes that may exist within
the Solar System. These probes may be very efficient
forms of communication simply because they last so
long, having a large ηtime (Bracewell 1960; Freitas 1983
estimates survival times of ∼ 106 yr for large probes
in high Earth orbits). They can also be an energy
efficient way of sending information, since they only
have to contact a neighboring planet instead of broad-
casting across interstellar space (Rose & Wright 2004).
If one posits replicating probes, then probes may ar-
rive from any society in the Galaxy (and maybe be-
yond), so that surveys for probes have R & 0.8 (Tipler
1980; Armstrong & Sandberg 2013). But even if all such
probes are non-replicating (Sagan & Newman 1983), the
surveys can be effective as long as societies send them to
∼ 103 stars (as in Bracewell 1960). It’s still not certain
whether interstellar travel is feasible, but some fairly
plausible projects have been proposed, including the
recent Breakthrough Starshot7, although the proposed
vessels generally do not stop in the destination sys-
tem (Crawford 1990; one futuristic exception is Forward
(1984)). However, searches for the artifacts of inter-
stellar travelers in the Solar System remain a relatively
unexplored avenue of SETI (reported observations in-
clude Freitas 1983; Steel 1995; theoretical discussions in-
clude Arkhipov 1995, 1996; Tough & Lemarchand 2004;
Haqq-Misra & Kopparapu 2012; Davies 2012).
There may be some other traces on alien home
planets that could remain visible for relatively long
times. Perhaps one could search for signs of
widescale pollution (Whitmire & Wright 1980; Lin et al.
2014; Stevens et al. 2015) or signs of geoengineering
(C´irkovic´ & Cathcart 2004; Lacki 2016). The feasibility
of these methods has not been studied much, though.
5. DISCUSSION
5.1. What if the Universe is not infinite?
I have assumed that the Universe is essentially infinite,
so that the likelihood of our existence is 1. However,
multiverse scenarios have their own problems. Aside
from the difficulty in testing them, there is the mea-
sure problem, which is an uncertainty about how to
assign probabilities in an infinite Universe. Naive ex-
trapolations of the current ΛCDM cosmology imply that
most observers, even those with our exact memories,
are Boltzmann brains produced by thermal fluctuations
of the cosmological event horizon (e.g., Dyson et al.
2002; Albrecht & Sorbo 2004; de Simone et al. 2010). A
short-lived Universe can end before many Boltzmann
brains appear, though (Page 2008).
If the Universe is small, though, we have to contend
with at least two unknown parameters: the true num-
ber of birthsites in the universe N⋆ and PETI. We
could then codify our uncertainty with a joint prior
d2Pprior/(dN⋆dPETI). The joint prior can be integrated
to find the marginal prior describing our prior belief in
PETI alone:
dPprior
dPETI
=
∫ ∞
0
d2Pprior
dN⋆dP ′ETI
∣∣∣
P′ETI=PETI
dN⋆. (35)
Likewise, the marginal prior on N⋆ is
dPprior
dN⋆
=
∫ 1
0
d2Pprior
dN ′⋆dPETI
∣∣∣
N ′
⋆
=N⋆
dPETI. (36)
7 https://breakthroughinitiatives.org/Initiative/3
24 Lacki
ln
 ln
 N
★
Π
0
ΠLC
Πmax
Πbig
0 ΠLC Πmax Πbig
Cr
ow
de
d
Is
ol
at
ed
Observable Universe
We
ak
 An
thr
op
ic b
ou
nd
Pl
au
si
bl
e 
en
tro
py
 b
ou
nd
Figure 6. A joint prior on ln lnN⋆ and Π is constrained by ob-
servations of the Universe’s size, thermodynamic lower bounds on
the probability of life evolving (Weak Copernican Principle), and
our own existence (Weak Anthropic Principle). We are isolated if
the true values of PETI and N⋆ lie above and to the left of the
heavy dash-dotted line.
There would be a few obvious bounds on these pa-
rameters, as indicated in Figure 6. The minimum size
of the Universe is constrained by observation, and there
are lower limits on PETI from bounds on the entropy
of living systems. If we presume that we are the re-
sult of a stochastic process, the inferential Weak An-
thropic Principle becomes the observation that the prob-
ability of our own existence is L(≥ 1 society|PETI) ≈
1− exp(−PETIN⋆). Using this likelihood in Bayes’ Rule
essentially removes the weight from possibilities where
PETIN⋆ ≪ 1, while leaving intact the weight where
PETIN⋆ ≫ 1.
How one would implement such a joint prior is un-
clear, however. The simplest method might be to start
out with a constant probability density everywhere, af-
ter transforming to the variables Π and ln lnN⋆ (Fig-
ure 7, left panel). After applying the inferential Weak
Anthropic Principle, the joint density remains constant
for values where PETIN⋆ ≫ 1. Unfortunately, the re-
sulting marginalized PDFs are no longer flat in Π and
ln lnN⋆ — the log log prior described in this paper no
longer applies to PETI. Instead, we would favor scenar-
ios where the Universe is large. Independently, we would
favor scenarios where PETI is big. We would not favor
scenarios where both N⋆ and PETI are big simultane-
ously, though. If we ever do discover aliens (red lines
in Figure 7), the marginalized PDF on ln lnN⋆ would
suddenly become flat, because all values of N⋆ are com-
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Figure 7. A uniform joint prior and the marginalized priors on
Π and ln lnN⋆ derived from it. A joint prior with constant density
favors belief in large PETI or large N⋆ after marginalization. The
red line demonstrates the effect of a detection by SETI, while
the dashed grey lines demonstrate the effect of proof that we are
isolated.
patible with abundant aliens. Proof that we are isolated
(dashed gray lines) moderately increase our belief in big
Universes.
Another possibility would be to decree that the log
log prior on PETI alone must be correct. The joint prior
would be more heavily weighted for small PETI (darker
shading in Figure 8, left panel) so that the marginalized
prior for PETI matches the log log prior. This scheme
heavily weights scenarios where the Universe is large,
since only a large Universe is consistent with our exis-
tence if PETI is small and our evolution is random. As
with the uniform joint prior, discovering aliens flattens
the marginal prior for ln lnN⋆, while proving our isola-
tion increases our belief that ln lnN⋆ is large.
Or we could decree that the marginal prior for ln lnN⋆
is constant, and place more weight in scenarios where
ln lnN⋆ is small (Figure 8, right panel). Now the
marginalized prior on Π is skewed to favor large PETI.
SETI surveys would have interesting effects on the
marginalized PDF for the Universe’s size. If we dis-
covered aliens, the marginalized PDF for ln lnN⋆ would
have a sharp peak near its lower limit because of the
prior’s weighting. Proving we are isolated leads to a
sharp fall-off near the lower limit, while slightly increas-
ing our confidence in a big Universe.
Hence, implementing the joint prior involves some-
what arbitrary decisions about how to weight it. One
could probably consider more complicated schemes, like
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Figure 8. Comparison of joint priors with different weights, and their derived marginalized priors on Π and ln lnN⋆. Darker blue shading
indicates a heavier joint prior density. If the joint prior density is scaled so that the marginalized Π prior is flat in Π (left), then a large
Universe is strongly favored. If the joint prior density is instead scaled so that the marginalized ln lnN⋆ prior is uniform in ln lnN⋆ (right),
a large PETI is strongly favored. The red line demonstrates the effect of a detection by SETI, while the dashed grey lines demonstrate the
effect of proof that we are isolated.
having a flat prior in the number of intelligent species
in the Universe. Unless the marginalized prior on PETI
was specifically forced to be the log log prior, the log log
prior used in the other sections no longer applies.
Aside from these practical difficulties, there is the
philosophical issue of what counts as the Universe.
Some alternatives to inflationary cosmology are effec-
tively multiverses in that they have an infinite number
of places to live (Rubenstein 2014). For example, ekpy-
rotic cosmologies posit that the Universe’s evolution is
basically cyclic, lasting an infinite time but being oc-
casionally reset by some process (Steinhardt & Turok
2002). Because birthsites can be defined temporally,
the endless lifespans of the Universe in these scenarios
still provide an endless number of chances for life and
intelligence to evolve, as long as PETI does not change
between cycles. Even if we had proof that the Universe
was finite in space and time, the many worlds interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics still could guarantee our
existence if it’s true, since each branch of the Universe’s
wavefunction is as real as the others, and would seem
real to its inhabitants (Tegmark 2014). As long as we
evolve on any branch of the wavefunction, the Weak
Anthropic Principle applies. The correct interpretation
of quantum mechanics may never be proven experimen-
tally, so the question of whether the Universe is small or
big may always be metaphysical.
5.2. The diversity of ETIs
A curious aspect of the log log prior is that it suggests
that there is a combinatorially high number of possi-
ble intelligent species, of order ∼ 1010
9
. This should be
true as long as lnPETI & −Sgenome, and if the possi-
ble genome sequences are even remotely equiprobable.
Then the number of possible intelligent species NETI is
roughly given by
lnNETI ≈ Sgenome − lnPETI. (37)
I estimated Sgenome ≈ 4× 109 in Section 3.3. According
to the log log prior, using the genome entropy bound,
we generally expect lnPETI to be several orders of mag-
nitude below 4 × 109, so lnNETI ≈ 4 × 10
9. This con-
clusion can be avoided if there are a few species (pre-
sumably including Homo sapiens) that are extreme at-
tractors in genome space. The odds would have to be
heavily skewed in favor of these species, with them being
∼ 1010
9
times being more likely than the mean probabil-
ity over genome space, to affect the estimate of lnNETI,
though.
If lifeforms are distinguished only by their proteomes,
then we can use the proteome entropy to estimate the
number of distinct types of intelligent life:
lnNETI ≈ Sproteome − lnPETI. (38)
Using the proteome entropy in the log log prior im-
plies ∼ 1010
7
kinds of intelligent life. While much
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smaller than the number of distinct species, this is still
a vast number. Most “types” would then consist of
exp(lnN speciesETI − lnN
proteome
ETI ) ≈ 10
109 species of intel-
ligent life, distinguished by their non-coding DNA and
the order in which the genes are coded.
These enormous numbers are a natural result if not all
of the information in the genome or proteome is relevant
for the development of intelligence. Even if intelligent
species must be basically humanoid, would their devel-
opment depend on the presence of hair, the number of
fingers and vertebrae, having the same taste receptors
as humans, much less the structure of every enzyme?
If not, then there are an exponentially large number of
species possible from all the combinations of non-vital
traits.
If evolution is contingent, then the odds that intelli-
gence evolved on Earth might be like the odds that a
tornado passes through a given location on a given day.
The weather is a highly chaotic system and contingent;
a single stray gust of wind just a few weeks before would
completely change the weather. It doesn’t follow that
every last eddy in the planet’s history is necessary for
there to be a tornado at that location. If history were
changed, new opportunities could arise; a breeze that in
our history would have inhibited the tornado could have
helped create a different one if that stray gust of wind
happened. While it’s probably true, as Gould famously
said, that “Homo sapiens is an entity, not a tendency”
(Gould 1989), intelligence is probably a panoply, not an
entity. Whether or not it’s also a tendency is an empir-
ical question.8
These estimates say nothing about the phenotypes of
possible alien intelligences. They could have radically
different biochemistries, or they could look identical to
humans while remaining a completely different species
genetically.
5.3. Small probabilities and the Fermi Paradox
The power of the Fermi Paradox is that it bends the
argument from large numbers — usually taken to be the
strongest argument in favor of aliens — against the ex-
istence of aliens. Our being alone among the trillions of
planets in the observable Universe requires an incredibly
small PETI. But the existence of trillions of technolog-
ical societies in the observable Universe requires that
the probability that they spread into space is incredibly
small. The beyond astronomically small probabilities
considered in this paper might undermine both argu-
ments, though. Just as a log log prior encompasses tiny
flfi, a modified version could accommodate tiny fc.
One possible “filter” between developing technology
8 Gould himself made this point in Gould (1987).
and achieving starflight is a standoff involving nuclear
weapons (as in Sagan & Newman 1983). Although we
survived the Cold War, the Anthropic Principle reminds
us that our vantage point is biased (C´irkovic´ et al. 2010)
— perhaps in virtually all histories we really did anni-
hilate ourselves. There were several incidents in which
global nuclear war was avoided only due to the actions
of a few people (e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists
2015).9 Maybe those actions were themselves flukes
— a rare fluctuation in the thermal noise of someone’s
brain might be amplified into an otherwise unlikely stray
thought that in turn stays someone’s hand during a nu-
clear crisis. If that was what happened, then the nuclear
filter could be essentially absolute. There are other pos-
sible filters. In analogy with there being an unknown
number N of conditions necessary for intelligent life to
arise, we may face an unknown numberN of future crises
before we attain starflight and cosmic engineering. If
those crises are independent, and if the probability that
a society survives each are of order 1/2, then the odds
of a society achieving starflight could easily be smaller
than 10−21 if N & 70.
A philosophical observation known as the Doomsday
Argument appears to support to hypotheses that the
odds are against anyone attaining starflight. The basic
idea, a kind of temporal Copernican Principle, is that
it’s unlikely that we are among the very first humans
to have every lived, so the total number of humans who
will ever live must not be many trillions (Gott 1993).
It is a counterweight to Hart (1975)’s formulation of
the Fermi Paradox: an interstellar society could expand
across its home galaxy at least, embracing billions of
stars and many trillions of people. Knobe et al. (2006)
used similar reasoning to make a Universal Doomsday
Argument: because interstellar societies are so big, they
would dominate the population of all sapient observers
unless they were extremely rare. Unless we are incred-
ibly atypical, the population of the Universe cannot be
concentrated into starfaring societies; thus, the fraction
of technological societies that spread across interstellar
space is negligible (Knobe et al. 2006).
The Doomsday Argument itself is extremely con-
tentious, though. Obviously it is wrong for some peo-
ple in the history of humanity, so it’s not inconceivable
that it’s wrong for us (Tarter 2007). Another response
is the Self-Indication Assumption, which states that we
should favor hypotheses that predict a larger number
of observers (Olum 2002). It is a bit like the causal
Weak Anthropic Principle: the probability that we exist
is larger if the Universe has more opportunities for us to
9 See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of nuclear close calls
(accessed 18 September 2016).
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exist. This assumption has its own problems, as it allows
essentially zero prior weight on the idea that the Uni-
verse is small (e.g., Bostrom & C´irkovic´ 2003). Over-
all, the debate around both the Doomsday Argument
and the Self-Indication Assumption arises from prob-
lems similar to those of the flat log prior for PETI. Each
suppresses the prior weight for some entirely reasonable
sounding hypothesis — star travel being possible, our
not living in a vast multiverse, or our not being isolated
— by factors of billions at least, so that no actual evi-
dence could ever persuade us otherwise (c.f., Olum 2002;
Bostrom & C´irkovic´ 2003).
Our own future evolution, at least, has some impor-
tant differences with the evolution of life and intelli-
gence. Most importantly, we have goals, whereas nat-
ural evolution does not. We can also anticipate future
crises. Future crises are not necessarily independent of
each other, either; many of the crises may involve funda-
mentally similar problems, like scarcity. Nor is it clear
that there always are bottlenecks. For example, the nu-
clear standoff during the Cold War may not have been
inevitable in our own history (Rhodes 1986), much less
in alien societies. Furthermore, like life in general, so-
cieties can be robust. If one didn’t know the history of
life on Earth, one might conclude its survival for billions
of years is nigh impossible given how many crises could
arise. But it has survived that long simply by being so
resilient, and while this may be a fluke that we observe
due to the Anthropic Principle (C´irkovic´ et al. 2010),
this is not generally thought to be the case.10
On the other hand, if one does accept the thesis behind
the Fermi Paradox, the log log prior actually strengthens
its power. As noted in Section 4, the Milky Way encom-
passes 80% of the prior’s weight for crowded Universe
scenarios, and about half is for PETI & 10−4. Defini-
tive evidence for our being alone in the Galaxy is then
good evidence that we are alone in the observable Uni-
verse, with Pcrowded cut to ∼ 0.2 × 0.2 ≈ 4%. The null
results from searches for Type III societies reduce the
Pcrowded estimates further, subject to systematic uncer-
tainties about these surveys’ grasp.
5.4. The prior applied to exolife and other complex
phenomena
The main ingredients plugged into the log log prior,
the number of birthsites and the bound on entropy, are
very generic. Similar priors could be constructed for any
potentially rare, complex phenomenon, including life it-
self. Indeed, the origin of life has been proposed to be
10 If one does accept the Doomsday Argument, it also predicts
that we are very unlikely to be the very last people who ever live
(Gott 1993), suggesting that technological societies do not collapse
at the slightest provocation.
the limiting factor for PETI (Conway Morris 2003), in
which case the log log prior for intelligence is the log
log prior for life. The protocell chemical entropy pro-
vides a plausible but very conservative lower bound on
the probability that life arises. As shown in Table 2,
the log log prior then implies a 15% credibility that life
has arisen on another planet in the Universe. In coming
decades, it may be possible to identify signs of life on
the nearest exoplanets (Seager 2014), suggesting a test
of the log log prior: we should never find any signs of
independent life on any exoplanet. This is a very weak
test, though, as the credibility for lifeless neighbor plan-
ets is only . 85%.
On the other hand, favorable probabilities for life’s
appearance may come from applying the timing of its
origin on Earth to the log log prior (Lineweaver & Davis
2002). Suppose the early Earth had many birthsites,
appearing at a rate of Γbirth. Assuming that there was
a duration ∆t1 between when life could have started
and when it did (Spiegel & Turner 2012), the Earth had
Nbirth = Γbirth∆t1 birthsites before life got started. The
expected rate that life appears during the window is
Γlife = PlifeΓbirth, where Plife is the probability that a
birthsite generates life (as in Scharf & Cronin 2016). For
an upper limit on Γbirth, I take the mass of the Earth’s
hydrosphere and apply the ML98 bound. The specific
internal energy of liquid water at 300 K and standard
pressure11 is 740 J g−1, for a total ∆E of 1.3×1034 erg, a
maximum Γbirth of 4× 1060 s−1, and a maximum Nbirth
of 1.2× 1077(∆t1/Gyr).
Spiegel & Turner (2012) demonstrate how a prior is
affected by the timing of life’s appearance. Roughly
speaking, we can group Γlife into two categories: a fast
case when Γlife & (∆t1)
−1 and a slow case Γlife .
(∆t2)
−1. In the slow case, ∆t2 describes the window
that life could have appeared while still allowing intel-
ligent life to evolve by now; because of the very weak
dependence of Π on Nbirth from the double logarithm,
I replace it with ∆t1 for simplicity. Then, the posterior
probability that life appears quickly is
P posteriorfast ≈
(
1 +
1− P priorfast
BP priorfast
)−1
, (39)
where B is the Bayes’ factor12, the ratio of likelihoods
for the slow and fast cases. In their “optimistic” case,
11 The difference in specific enthalpy for ice at melting and ice
at absolute zero is 300 J g−1, and the specific enthalpy of melting
is another 330 J g−1, all at standard pressure (Feistel & Wagner
2006). Heating liquid water, with a specific heat of 4.2 J g−1 K−1,
from the melting point to 300 K requires 110 J g−1. I ignore the
(minor) correction from enthalpy to internal energy.
12 Denoted R in Spiegel & Turner (2012).
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B = 15 and ∆t1 = 0.2 Gyr. The log log prior, how-
ever, starts out disfavoring the fast case, which has a
prior probability ln[1 + lnNbirth]/ ln[1 − lnPmin]. For
the protocell entropy Pmin and the maximal birthsite
rate calculated above, this is 19%.
The optimistic case of Spiegel & Turner (2012) then
gives P posteriorfast ≈ 78%. That value weakly supports
the conclusion of Lineweaver & Davis (2002) that life
emerges quickly on planets. Yet the “conservative” cases
of Spiegel & Turner (2012) merely increase Pfast to 20%.
Furthermore, Γbirth is probably much lower than the
maximum value. In principle, Nbirth ≈ 1, for which
P priorfast ≈ 2% and P
posterior
fast ≈ 20% in the optimistic case.
The key improvement is that the log log prior has well-
defined bounds — if B definitely exceeds 100 then it does
favor rapidly appearing life even for lnNbirth ≈ 1, un-
like the logarithmic prior, which can have an arbitrarily
small normalization (Spiegel & Turner 2012).
One potential problem with applying the log log prior
to different complex phenomena indiscriminately is that
these phenomena may be dependent on one another.
The evolution of intelligent life on a planet happens only
if life appears on the planet first. One can posit a whole
chain of dependent phenomena of increasing rarity: life,
complex multicellular life, intelligent life, humanoid in-
telligences, Homo sapiens, humans that share your ex-
act memories, and chemically identical versions of you.
Properly constraining the probability of each step would
require the construction of a joint prior on the proba-
bility of each step happening. The marginalized prior
density for each step would then no longer be a log log
prior. Generally, the Bayesian expectation for the prob-
abilities of earlier steps would be higher than with a
simple log log prior (c.f. Section 5.1).
A stronger test of the log log prior than exolife alone
may be to check whether known astrophysical phenom-
ena are evenly distributed in Π. For example, if our past
light cone contains N kinds of stellar phenomena, about
N/2 should be expressed in a random sample of ∼ 103
stars over their lifetimes. Distinct phenomena might
be classified according to criteria proposed by Harwit
(1981).
6. SUMMARY
The log log prior is a plausible framework for evaluat-
ing evidence for or against alien societies. It can be jus-
tified from the uncertainty in the number of constraints
that need to be fulfilled for intelligence to evolve, and it
can be phrased in terms of entropy differences, informa-
tion, or state space dimensionality. The main advantage
of the log log prior is that it can accommodate a great
range of PETI, from e−3×10
122
to 1. Unlike a flat log
prior, it responds to observations even in the face of
possible systematic errors. The potential for systematic
errors is inevitable for any realistic experiment. The log
log prior can provide a guide for measuring the relative
power of SETI surveys.
Essentially by design, the log log prior is not all that
profound in its content. It basically is just the state-
ment that, for all we know, P−1ETI could be 1, 10
1, 1010,
10100, 101,000, 1010,000, 10100,000, 101,000,000, 1010,000,000,
10100,000,000, or 101,000,000,000, so we might as well con-
sider any of those values as an equally valid possibility
(using Pmin = 10−10
9
here as an example). The calcula-
tions of Pcrowded just amount to the observation that for
the first three of those values, we’re not isolated, while
for the others, we are, so the odds that we’re isolated are
a few to one. The prior can even be summarized in non-
Bayesian terms: we are very uncertain about the number
of factors that contribute to intelligence’s evolution, so
we are very, very uncertain about the probability that
it happens.
What is new is simply the emphasis placed on each
value. A flat log prior amounts to the statement that,
for all we know, P−1ETI could be 10
0, 101, 102, and so
on, through 10999,999,998, 10999,999,999, or 101,000,000,000,
so we might as well consider any of those values as an
equally valid possibility. But this inherently implies a
belief that log10 PETI ∼ 10
−9 with near certainty. It
tacitly implies that we are virtually certain that we are
isolated. Or, in non-Bayesian terms, we are a bit un-
certain about the number of factors that contribute to
intelligence’s evolution, and we are very uncertain about
its probability, but we are quite sure it’s small.13
It is important to remember that the prior is a
Bayesian probability, measuring our confidence about
the abundance of ETIs, whereas PETI is a frequentist
probability, an intrinsic feature of birthsites. While
I estimate a ∼ 15–20% (Bayesian) credibility that
there are other intelligent species in the observable Uni-
verse, for almost all PETI, the frequentist probability
P(isolated|PETI) that we’re isolated is almost always
∼ 0 or ∼ 1. Conversely, the fact that this frequentist
probability is probably ∼ 0 or ∼ 1 does not mean we
should be confident about whether or not we can con-
tact aliens. Just because there are ∼ 1021 planets in
the observable Universe, it does not follow that there
must be ETIs among them, because we are not totally
confident that PETI & 10
−21. And even if the evolution
of intelligence depends on a vast number of contingent
13 We could do much worse still, though, with an flat inverse
prior (Spiegel & Turner 2012). This would be the statement that
P−1
ETI
could be 1, 2, 3, ..., 101,000,000,000 − 2, 101,000,000,000 − 1,
or 101,000,000,000 so we might as well consider any of these values
as an equally valid possibility. Now one would be nearly certain
that 10−1,000,000,000 ≤ PETI . 10
−999,999,998 , far too precise to
be realistic.
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events, it does not follow that we must be alone, because
we are not confident that there are just a few ways for
intelligence to evolve.
According to the log log prior, we should approach
SETI with a degree of agnosticism about whether there
are aliens in the observable Universe. Despite that, the
prior consistently leans towards mild skepticism about
their presence. I find that the most realistic bound on
Pmin, the genome entropy, implies that Pcrowded ≈ 18%.
Even with the most optimistic assumptions, with the
maximal number of birthsites possible and using the
protein shape entropy to bound Pmin, Pcrowded ≈ 47%.
Of course, Pisolated is quite far from the traditional 95%
credibility threshold for a conclusion. A positive detec-
tion would be one of the most profound discoveries ever.
This epochal potential more than offsets the relatively
moderate risks for the relatively low spending on SETI.
Still, it does mean the null results from SETI are not
surprising. The “Great Silence” is an expected result of
the log log prior.
The log log prior is not without its own issues. Most
importantly, it’s not clear how to define a “birthsite”.
Should it refer to an entire planet, or maybe something
smaller, like a speciation event? If we use a large body as
a birthsite, we should account for the possibility that life
or intelligence arises an unknown, possibly large number
of times. If we use common events as birthsites, which
is appropriate if PETI depends on the time a habitat is
hospitable, then they almost certainly interact with one
another, making it difficult to calculate the number of
ETIs expected. The issue is related to the subjective de-
cision about how to handle values of PETI near 1, where
ln | lnPETI| itself diverges. I chose to use the auxiliary
variable Π = ln(1 + lnPETI), but this is not the only
possible choice. The prior is also slightly affected by the
choice of the base of the inner logarithm.
The other main issue is which value of Pmin to use.
The cosmological entropies ideally should be absolute
bounds. Yet they are not totally robust. The entropy
within the particle or event horizons increases without
bound in cosmologies without dark energy or if w > −1,
although it takes ∼ 1040 years for this to seriously affect
the estimates of Pcrowded. Within the ΛCDM cosmology,
observers living more than ∼ 100 billion years in the
future may not be aware there is a cosmological event
horizon (Krauss & Scherrer 2007). Furthermore, while
well motivated, the entropy of the cosmological horizons
and Bekenstein-like bounds in general are not empiri-
cally proven. On smaller scales, we could use the chem-
ical entropy of an organism or a planetary biosphere
to limit Pmin. However, PETI values as small as these
Pmin essentially imply that we are Boltzmann brains, in
which case none of our reasoning can be justified. Even
the larger Pmin associated with the protocell entropy is
compatible with strange evolutionary histories, such as
those where life is juggled across the worlds of the Solar
System, or even different star systems entirely.
Values of Pmin as small as those considered in this pa-
per implicitly require that the Universe is very large if
our evolution is a stochastic process. Multiverse theo-
ries face the measure problem (e.g., Albrecht & Sorbo
2004) and may not be testable. If one favors a small
Universe, one can set up a joint prior on the size of the
Universe and PETI, but then the marginalized prior on
PETI alone is not the log log prior anymore unless the
weighting is uneven. Additionally, the Universe would
have to be small in time as well as space, disallowing
cyclic cosmologies. Furthermore, the many-worlds in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics cannot hold if the
Universe is small (Tegmark 2014), but we may never
know whether or not it is true.
As frequently acknowledged, PETI itself is not the only
factor determining whether we will ever find an alien
society (Sagan 1963, 1973; Bates 1978; Forgan & Nichol
2011). SETI surveys are only constraining if we look
for traces that are physically possible, commonly pro-
duced by technological societies, and last a long time.
The weighted reach of current SETI surveys, the num-
ber of targets they look at, is quite good according to
the log log prior (Table 4). Their grasps, however, the
amount of prior weight they can constrain after consid-
ering the effectiveness of the survey method, are debat-
able. Current methods are haunted by the potentially
short lifespan of radio or optical broadcasting, or by
systematic uncertainties about whether megastructures
are physically and socially plausible. ISearches for small
probes in the Solar System may be an effective way to
proceed, because they last so long and seem fairly fea-
sible. The log log prior suggests that the probes do not
have to be self-replicating, sweeping through the Galaxy
ravenously, for this to be an effective tracer.
I thank Juna Kollmeier for discussions. In addition,
I wish to acknowledge the use of NASA’s Astrophysics
Data System and arXiv.
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